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Abstract
We develop and analyze a labor market model in which heterogeneous
ﬁrms operate under decreasing returns and compete for labor by posting
long-term contracts. Firms achieve faster growth by oﬀering higher life-
time wages, which allows them to ﬁll vacancies with higher probability,
consistent with recent empirical ﬁndings. The model also captures several
other regularities about ﬁrm size, job ﬂows and pay, and generates sluggish
aggregate dynamics of labor market variables. In contrast to existing bar-
gaining models with large ﬁrms, eﬃciency obtains and the model allows a
tractable characterization over the business cycle.
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1 Introduction
Search models of the labor market following the Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides
framework have traditionally abstracted from the role of ﬁrms, concentrating on
the concepts of jobs and vacancies (see, e.g., Rogerson et al. (2005)). While
a recent wave of contributions include ﬁrm size through decreasing returns in
production, they rely on the standard assumption that vacancies are ﬁlled at
a common matching rate which depends on aggregate market conditions but is
independent of the characteristics of the ﬁrm that posts the job. In this paper we
propose an alternative theory in which heterogeneous ﬁrms compete for workers
through their wage announcements, which naturally implicates diﬀerential job-
ﬁlling rates across ﬁrms. This theory predicts several relations for the cross-
section of ﬁrms and for the time-variation over the business cycle that seem to
match with recent empirical ﬁndings. The ﬁrm dynamics are eﬃcient, and the
model setting remains tractable even in the presence of aggregate shocks.
Recent empirical evidence highlights that the probability of ﬁlling jobs depends
on the characteristics of the ﬁrm. In the cross-section, Davis et al. (2013) show
that ﬁrms expand faster not only by posting more vacancies, but especially by
ﬁlling these vacancies at higher rates; for example, the job-ﬁlling rate almost
doubles as monthly employment growth increases from 10% to 20%. Across
time, they back out an aggregate measure of “recruiting intensity” that moves
pro-cyclically, leading to a lower level of matching eﬃciency for a given labor
market tightness in downturns.
Our theory models ﬁrms through decreasing returns to labor as in Hopenhayn
and Rogerson (1993). In the labor market, we follow the competitive search
literature (e.g. Moen (1997)) where employers can publicly post long-term wage
contracts to attract unemployed workers. When a ﬁrm attracts more workers to
its vacancies, the matching rate increases. In our setting with large ﬁrms, we allow
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the ﬁrms to choose the number of vacancies alongside the posted wage contracts,
and it is in fact optimal for them to use both margins. Therefore, matching
rates are not an aggregate object but are ﬁrm-speciﬁc. Growing ﬁrms decide
to oﬀer better contracts if it is increasingly costly to hire additional workers,
which arises, for example, when recruitment takes up time of the existing workers
(Shimer (2010)), so that ﬁrms expand their workforce slowly over time. We argue
that this feature not only generates varying job-ﬁlling rates at the micro level,
but also gives rise to sensible aggregate dynamics. Particularly, important labor
market variables, such as the job-ﬁnding rate, react with delay to aggregate
shocks. While such sluggish adjustment is consistent with the evidence from
vector autoregressions (e.g. Fujita and Ramey (2007)), it is hard to reconcile
with the textbook search and matching model (Shimer (2005)). In a quantitative
assessment, our model tracks well both the cross-sectional variation as well as the
business-cycle variation of recruiting intensity described by Davis et al. (2013). It
also leads to slow adjustment of the aggregate job-ﬁnding rate and other desirable
business-cycle properties.
Our view that ﬁrms can attract workers to their vacancies is aimed to capture
the features mentioned above and to provide an alternative framework to think
about job creation and job destruction of heterogeneous ﬁrms in frictional labor
markets that contrasts with the prevailing workhorse model based on random
search and bilateral bargaining pioneered by Stole and Zwiebel (1996) and Smith
(1999).1 One obvious diﬀerence between the models is the rate at which ﬁrms
ﬁll their jobs. In the existing contributions, this is governed by the aggregate
matching function, so that ﬁrms can only hire more if they post more vacancies,
1Subsequent work adopts this approach to study, for example, unemployment and eﬃciency
(Bertola and Caballero (1994), Acemoglu and Hawkins (2014)), labor and product market
regulation (Koeniger and Prat (2007), Ebell and Haefke (2009)), business cycles (e.g., Elsby
and Michaels (2013), Fujita and Nakajima (2013)), and international trade and its labor market
implications (Helpman and Itskhoki (2010)).
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which conﬂicts with the evidence cited above. Our model naturally focuses on
both recruiting margins, the number of vacancies and their ﬁlling rate.
A second diﬀerence to the prevailing models concerns the normative implica-
tions. In the bargaining frameworks, ﬁrms hire excessively in order to depress
the wages of all their workers, yielding a within-ﬁrm externality (see e.g. Smith
(1999)).2 In our setting, contracts are long-term, eliminating the ineﬃciency
within the ﬁrm. Combined with public posting of wage contracts this induces
eﬃcient outcomes both on the extensive margins of ﬁrm entry/exit and on the
intensive margins of ﬁrm expansion/contraction, governed by a modiﬁed Hosios
(1990) condition. This extends standard eﬃciency results of competitive search
(see e.g. Moen (1997)) to settings with rich ﬁrm dynamics.3
Finally, we establish that our environment is particularly tractable, even out-
side of steady state. While one could possibly add recruiting intensity to existing
bargaining models, the complications arising from such settings, especially in the
presence of aggregate shocks, make this diﬃcult. Tractability in our model arises
from free entry of ﬁrms and competitive search. When a ﬁrm decides whether
to hire and what contracts to oﬀer, it needs to know the workers’ utility value
of unemployment, as this deﬁnes the relevant outside option. This utility value
generally depends on the distribution of other ﬁrms in the market, which is an
inﬁnite-dimensional object. In our setting, since workers can choose where to
search for a job, they are indiﬀerent between existing ﬁrms and new entrants,
2In contrast to one-worker bargaining models, the ineﬃciency cannot be corrected by an
appropriate level of the bargaining power parameter. Even with wage commitments, the ran-
domness of the search process generates an across-ﬁrm externality that impedes eﬃciency (see
Hawkins (2014)).
3We are not aware of a formal eﬃciency result for large ﬁrms operating under decreasing
returns. Hawkins (2013) suggests such an outcome on the basis of a static model, but his
results are complicated by the stochastic nature of the hiring process and they do not extend
to his dynamic setting with shocks. Menzio and Moen (2010) do not obtain eﬃciency because
they focus on lack of commitment, and Garibaldi et al. (2014) abstract from decreasing returns.
While eﬃciency often obtains in competitive-search settings, the subtle nature of search markets
does not render this insight obvious when choices along diﬀerent margins interact (cf. Galenianos
and Kircher (2009), Guerrieri (2008), and Footnote 19).
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and the latter number adjusts to equate the marginal beneﬁt to the entry costs,
independent of the existing ﬁrms. This implies that only the current aggregate
productivity enters the workers’ utility value and hence the ﬁrms’ optimization
problem, eliminating the need for approximation techniques like those of Krusell
and Smith (1998) that are usually necessary to study business cycles with het-
erogeneous ﬁrms (e.g. Elsby and Michaels (2013), Fujita and Nakajima (2013)).
The fact that individual ﬁrms’ policy functions jump with business cycle shocks
does not imply, however, that important aggregate variables, such as the workers’
job-ﬁnding rate, jump as well. To the contrary, the distribution of ﬁrms evolves
slowly and many job openings are not governed by free entry. Hence, the aggre-
gate job-ﬁnding rate and the vacancy-unemployment ratio feature a slow response
to business-cycle shocks, as documented by Fujita and Ramey (2007) and Fujita
(2011), as well as an imperfect correlation with aggregate productivity (Shimer
(2005)).
The idea that policy functions are jump variables also features in Pissarides
(2000) for random search and in Shi (2009) and Menzio and Shi (2010, 2011) for
competitive search, but in those settings there is entry at all wage contracts and
the job-ﬁnding rate is a jump variable, perfectly correlated with aggregate pro-
ductivity.4 Since the link between ﬁrm-level dynamics and aggregate dynamics
is important, we explore this feature in more detail in the quantitative section of
this paper. Indeed we demonstrate that the calibrated model generates aggregate
labor market dynamics that are largely in line with the U.S. business cycle. It
generates sluggish responses of key labor market variables, and aggregate mea-
sures of the vacancy yield and of the recruiting intensity show similar cyclicality
and volatility as found by Davis et al. (2013).
4In Shi (2009) and Menzio and Shi (2010, 2011), ﬁrms are indiﬀerent between all contracts
and there is free entry at every contract. In our setting, the workers are indiﬀerent between all
wage contracts, but there is still free entry on the ﬁrms’ side. This additional feature brings
about the diﬀerence in some results, while retaining tractability.
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Our work describes the recruitment behavior of ﬁrms competing for unem-
ployed workers. One could envision additionally competition for employed work-
ers. Burdett and Mortensen (1998), Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002) and Moscarini
and Postel-Vinay (2013) explore this in random search environments, but the
complexity of these models makes it diﬃcult to study ﬁrm dynamics, as ﬁrms
are usually assumed to face neither idiosyncratic nor aggregate shocks.5 In
the competitive-search literature, job-to-job mobility has been considered by Shi
(2009), Menzio and Shi (2010, 2011), Garibaldi et al. (2014) and recently Schaal
(2012). Except for the last contribution, ﬁrm size in these models is not re-
stricted by the operated technology, circumventing considerations induced by the
diﬀerence between average and marginal product. Schaal (2012) diﬀers from ours
by assuming linear recruitment costs, which imply that ﬁrms immediately jump
to their desired sizes, they are indiﬀerent between all contracts and hence face
identical job-ﬁlling rates, and there is no aggregate sluggishness.
To build intuition for our model and to highlight its features, we ﬁrst analyze a
simpliﬁed environment without productivity shocks. In that setting we derive im-
plications relating ﬁrm size and growth to pay and job-ﬁlling rates. Subsequently
we establish tractability and eﬃciency in the presence of shocks, and discuss the
robustness of our propositions. We then move to a quantitative assessment to
analyze the main cross-sectional and business-cycle features. As a policy appli-
cation, we explore the impact of hiring subsidies on labor market dynamics. All
proofs and some extensions are relegated to the Appendix.
5Moscarini and Postel-Vinay (2013) do allow for aggregate shocks, but their requirement of
rank-preserving hiring prevents the study of ﬁrm entry and ﬁrm-speciﬁc shocks. To our knowl-
edge, the only model that explicitly focuses on ﬁrm dynamics is Lentz and Mortensen (2012),
which combines decreasing returns with on-the-job search, but again it has no idiosyncratic or
aggregate shocks.
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2 The Model
2.1 The Environment
The model is set in discrete time and has a continuum of workers and ﬁrms.
The mass of workers is normalized to one. Each worker is inﬁnitely-lived, risk-
neutral, and discounts future income with factor β < 1. A worker supplies
one unit of labor per period when employed and receives income b ≥ 0 when
unemployed. Only unemployed workers search for employment, so there are no
job-to-job transitions. On the other side of the labor market is an endogenous
mass of ﬁrms. Firms are large relative to workers, in the sense that each active
ﬁrm employs a continuum of workers. Firms are also risk neutral and have the
same discount factor β.
In each period, a ﬁrm produces output xzF (L) with L ≥ 0 workers, where F is
a twice diﬀerentiable, strictly increasing and strictly concave function satisfying
F ′(0) = ∞ and F ′(∞) = 0. x ∈ X is idiosyncratic productivity and z ∈ Z
is aggregate productivity. Both x and z follow Markov processes on ﬁnite state
spaces X and Z with respective transition probabilities π(x+|x) and ψ(z+|z).
Each existing ﬁrm pays an operating cost f ≥ 0 per period. Each new entrant
pays setup cost K(z), possibly dependent on the aggregate state, and draws an
initial productivity level x0 ∈ X with probability π0(x0). Firms die with exoge-
nous probability δ0 > 0, in which case all workers are laid oﬀ into unemployment.
Furthermore, each worker quits a job with exogenous probability s0 ≥ 0. δ0 are
s0 are lower bounds on the actual exit and separation rates δ ≥ δ0, s ≥ s0, since
ﬁrms may decide to leave the market or to lay oﬀ some workers in the event of
an adverse productivity shock.
Search for new hires is a costly activity. A ﬁrm with workforce L and pro-
ductivity xz that posts V vacancies incurs recruitment costs C(V, L, xz). Apart
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from twice diﬀerentiability, we assume that a ﬁrm’s output net of recruitment
costs is strictly increasing in (L, xz) and strictly concave in (V, L). In particular,
this requires that C is strictly convex in V . Popular functional form are
C(V, L, xz) = xzF (L)−xzF (L−hV )+k(V ) or C(V, L, xz) = c
1 + γ
(
V
L
)γ
V .
(1)
In the ﬁrst speciﬁcation, k(V ) captures some convex monetary costs (see e.g.
Cooper et al. (2007)) and hV captures labor input in recruitment (see e.g. Shimer
(2010)). Even in the absence of monetary costs and despite linearity of the labor
input, this leads to convex costs because of decreasing returns in production.6
The second, constant-returns speciﬁcation, which is borrowed from Merz and
Yashiv (2007), assumes that average costs per vacancy depend on the vacancy
rate (i.e. vacancies divided by employment), allowing larger ﬁrms with propor-
tionally higher vacancies to incur the same unit costs.7 In either setting, ﬁrms
cannot instantaneously grow large simply by posting enough vacancies at con-
stant marginal cost. For some proofs of cross-sectional relationships derived be-
low (Proposition 1 and subsequent corollaries), we focus on cost functions such
as those in (1) which satisfy the following properties on cross-derivatives:8
6Clearly no more workers can be engaged in hiring than are present at the ﬁrm. To get
the hiring process started for entrant ﬁrms, we need to assume that a new ﬁrm is endowed
with initial labor input of the entrepreneur Le so that the actual labor input is L˜ = Le + L.
Recruitment activities are then constrained by hV ≤ L+Le, and Inada conditions on F ensure
that this constraint never binds. A similar adjustment is needed for the second speciﬁcation in
(1) to avoid division by zero at entrant ﬁrms (see Section 3).
7To be precise, Merz and Yashiv (2007) specify and estimate convex adjustment costs (at
the aggregate level) that depend on hires rather than vacancies. Relatedly, Blatter et al. (2012)
estimate hiring costs on Swiss ﬁrm-level data and also ﬁnd evidence for convexity. Costs that
depend on hires better reﬂect training costs and could additionally be introduced into our
framework. Costs that depend on the number of job openings capture recruiting costs and are
more common in the search and matching literature.
8The ﬁrst two conditions state that an additional vacancy is more expensive if the ﬁrm is
smaller or if it is more productive. This arises in (1) because in a smaller ﬁrm a given number
of vacancies has a higher weight, while at higher productivity it is more costly to withdraw
workers from production. The third condition guarantees that the ﬁrm’s value function is
supermodular in (xz, L) (i.e. more productive ﬁrms gain more from being larger), since output
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(C) C12 ≤ 0 , C13 ≥ 0 , and − C12C13/C11 ≤ F ′ − C23 .
We formulate a competitive search equilibrium in which ﬁrms compete for
workers by posting long-term contracts. Unemployed workers direct their job
search towards the most attractive oﬀers: they can observe all contracts and
choose for which one to search. At any type of contract, job seekers and vacancies
are matched according to a matching function: if a contract attracts λ workers
per vacancy, the matching function determines the probability m with which each
vacancy gets ﬁlled. Therefore, a ﬁrm ﬁlls its vacancies with probability m only
if it oﬀers a contract that attracts λ(m) unemployed job seekers per vacancy.9
Standard assumptions on the matching function guarantee that this function is
twice diﬀerentiable, strictly increasing and strictly convex in m, with λ(0) = 0,
λ′(0) ≥ 1 and λ′(1) = ∞.10 It is increasing since ﬁrms achieve a higher matching
probability only if more workers are searching for their vacancies. It is convex
since it becomes increasingly diﬃcult to increase the matching rate when more
workers are attracted to the vacant job. The workers’ matching probability is
m/λ(m), which is strictly decreasing.
The labor market within each period operates in three stages. First, aggre-
gate productivity is revealed, new ﬁrms enter, and idiosyncratic productivities
are revealed. Second, ﬁrms produce and they decide about vacancy postings,
contracts oﬀered to new hires, layoﬀs, and possibly about exiting at the end of
minus vacancy costs are supermodular in these variables (right-hand side) and larger than any
countervailing indirect eﬀects that these variable have via the number of vacancies (left-hand
side). This holds trivially if costs are independent of either productivity or size.
9We follow the standard assumption in the search literature with large ﬁrms ithat each job
has its own matching probability, i.e., applicants from one job cannot be hired at another job in
the same ﬁrm, which arises, for example, if diﬀerent jobs require diﬀerent qualiﬁcations. Only
few papers explore the idea that workers are literally identical and can be hired for another job
than the one they applied for (see Burdett et al. (2001), Hawkins (2013) and Lester (2010)).
10Function λ is the inverse of the standard matching function m˜ : [0,∞) → [0, 1) that maps
the realized unemployed-vacancy ratio λ˜ into the hiring probability. Typically, m˜ is assumed
to be strictly increasing and strictly concave, and m˜(λ˜) ≤ min(1, λ˜) guarantees that m˜′(0) ≤ 1.
Therefore, we can deﬁne λ(m) = m˜−1(m), and the properties in the text follow.
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the period. Separated workers enter the unemployment pool and start to search
for employment in the next period. And third, unemployed workers and vacant
jobs are matched.11
In the next section, we consider a stationary environment without idiosyncratic
or aggregate productivity shocks. This allows us to focus on ﬁrm growth in a
particularly tractable labor market model with a simple contract space. We
extend this environment in Section 2.3.
2.2 The Stationary Model
This section abstracts from productivity shocks. That is, we set aggregate pro-
ductivity to z = 1. Idiosyncratic productivity stays constant throughout the life
of a ﬁrm but may diﬀer across ﬁrms who draw their productivity upon entry. We
also set operating costs f to zero. The absence of shocks implies in particular
that ﬁrms neither voluntarily exit the market, nor do they lay oﬀ any workers.
Hence, the exit and separation rates are exogenous, δ = δ0 and s = s0, and so is
any worker’s retention probability ϕ ≡ (1− δ)(1− s).
To attract unemployed job seekers, a recruiting ﬁrm announces a ﬂat ﬂow wage
w to be paid to its new hires for the duration of the employment relation. The
assumption that the ﬁrm oﬀers the same wage to all its new hires turns out not
to entail a restriction; see the discussion following equation (5) below. Further,
because of risk neutrality, only the net present value that a ﬁrm promises to the
worker matters. Flat wages are one way of delivering these promises.12
Unemployed workers direct their search optimally to the wages oﬀered by ﬁrms.
To understand what wage w(m) a ﬁrm has to oﬀer in order to achieve matching
11It follows from this speciﬁcation that new entrants can only produce output with their ﬁrst
hires in the period after entry.
12This is a theory of the present value of oﬀered wages. Constant wages can be viewed as the
limiting case of risk-neutral ﬁrms and risk-averse workers, as risk aversion vanishes. But other
payment patterns are conceivable; for further discussion about this issue, see Section 2.3.2.
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probability m, note that in a stationary environment an unemployed worker who
is seeking for a particular wage in one period is willing to search for that wage in
every period.13 Let U denote the discounted present value from such job search.
It is given by the following asset value equation:14
(1− β)U = b+ m
λ(m)
β(1− δ)w(m)− (1− β)U
1− βϕ︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡ρ
. (2)
It states that the ﬂow value of unemployment equals the current period unem-
ployment income b together with an option value from searching, denoted by ρ.
The search value is the probability of ﬁnding a job multiplied with the worker’s
discounted job surplus. Since workers have a choice where to search for a job, their
ﬂow value from unemployment must be equal in all markets that attract workers.
Therefore, ρ is a global value that is common to all markets, which means that a
ﬁrm has to oﬀer the following wage to achieve matching rate m > 0:
w(m) ≡ b+ ρ+ 1− βϕ
β(1− δ)
λ(m)
m
ρ . (3)
This relation says that a ﬁrm can only recruit workers when its wage oﬀer matches
the workers’ unemployment value (1−β)U = b+ρ plus a premium which is needed
to attract workers to jobs with ﬁlling rate m. This premium is increasing in m,
which is a crucial insight. The relationship between job-ﬁlling rates and wage
oﬀers is standard in the competitive search literature.
13Note that unemployed workers are indiﬀerent between all equilibrium search strategies.
Hence this model makes no predictions about the relationship between wages and unemploy-
ment duration.
14Bellman equations for employed and unemployed workers are E = w + β[ϕE + (1 − ϕ)U ]
and U = b+β[mλ(m)−1(1−δ)E+(1−mλ(m)−1(1−δ))U ]. Equation (2) follows by substituting
the ﬁrst into the second.
10
2.2.1 The Firms’ Recruitment Policies
Consider the problem of a ﬁrm that takes the search value of unemployed workers
and the associated relationship (3) as given. Later, the search value will be
determined as an equilibrium object that depends on the number of ﬁrms and
their wage oﬀers.
Let Jx(L,W ) be the value function of a ﬁrm that has productivity x, em-
ploys L workers and is committed to a wage bill of W per period for its current
workforce. Wages are commitments that have to be fulﬁlled as long as a worker
does not separate. Therefore, the ﬁrm has to pay a net present value of existing
commitments of W/(1 − βϕ) independent of its future hiring decisions, which
implies Jx(L,W ) = Jx(L, 0)−W/(1− βϕ). This allows us to focus on Jx(L, 0),
which eliminates the wage bill as a state variable. The ﬁrm’s recruitment choices
involve the number of posted vacancies V as well as the job-ﬁlling probability m,
which requires a wage oﬀer of w(m). Its recursive proﬁt maximization problem
is expressed as
Jx(L, 0) = max
(m,V )∈[0,1]×R+
xF (L)− C(V, L, x)−D(m)V + β(1− δ)Jx(L+, 0) ,
s.t. L+ = L(1− s) +mV , (4)
where D(m)V ≡ w(m)β(1− δ)/(1− βϕ)mV represents the net present value of
the additional wage commitments for its mV new hires, whose wages are paid
once they enter production next period. The other terms in the ﬁrst line represent
output, recruitment costs, and the value of continuing with a changed workforce.
The second line says that employment next period consists of the retained workers
and the new hires.
Problem (4) makes it readily apparent that a ﬁrm has two channels to hire
workers in a given period. It can increase the number of vacancies and associated
11
costs C, or it can increase the ﬁlling rate of each job and associated costs D. Note
that both C(·, L, x) and D(·) are convex - the latter inherits this from matching
function λ(m). This implies that ﬁrms use both recruitment channels if they want
to hire faster: more vacancies and higher matching rates per vacancy. This can
readily be seen from the optimality conditions for the control variables in (4).
These are derived rigorously in Appendix A, but we provide some intuition here
for the main trade-oﬀs. The optimal choices for the number of vacancies and their
matching probability are governed by one intratemporal and one intertemporal
optimality condition.
Regarding the intratemporal optimality condition, consider a ﬁrm that aims
to hire H workers in this period. It faces the problem of choosing the number
of vacancies and the job-ﬁlling probability to minimize costs C(V, .) + D(m)V
subject to H = mV . The ﬁrst-order condition for this problem is
C1(V, L, x) = D
′(m)m−D(m) = ρ[mλ′(m)− λ(m)] . (5)
This links the marginal recruitment costs to the marginal increase in wage costs
associated with increases in the job-ﬁlling probability.
Relationship (5) oﬀers a number of insights. It deﬁnes the optimal policy for
vacancy postings V = V x(m,L) as a function of the job-ﬁlling rate and ﬁrm
size. Because of convex recruitment costs, this policy function is increasing in m;
thus, vacancy postings and job-ﬁlling rates are complementary tools in the ﬁrm’s
recruitment strategy. This captures the basic stylized fact highlighted by Davis
et al. (2013) that ﬁrms use both more vacancies as well as higher job-ﬁlling rates
to achieve faster growth.15 In contrast, under constant marginal recruitment
costs (C1(V, L, x) = c), as assumed in much of the literature, the job-ﬁlling rate
15The ﬁrst equation in (5) suggests that this argument holds in a broader class of models
in which ﬁrms can inﬂuence job-ﬁlling rates. In our model, job-ﬁlling rates are increased via
higher wage oﬀers which reﬂects the allocative role of wages in the labor market.
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would be constant and independent of ﬁrm characteristics, while all employment
adjustment is instantaneous and is achieved through the number of vacancies.
Finally, note that equation (5) balances the wage costs for new hires against
recruitment costs at a unique point, which shows why a ﬁrm would not want to
oﬀer diﬀerent wages at a given point in time even if this were permissable.
The ﬁrm also decides how to structure hiring over time. This is governed by
an intertemporal optimality condition which reads
xF ′(L+)− C2(V+, L+, x)− b− ρ = ρβ(1− δ)
[
λ′(m)− βϕλ′(m+)
]
. (6)
Here L+, V+, and m+ are employment, vacancy postings and the job-ﬁlling rate
in the next period. The left-hand side of (6) gives the marginal beneﬁt of a higher
workforce in the next period. If this is high, then the ﬁrm rather hires more now
than to wait and hire next period, as expressed by the right-hand side which is
increasing in the current job-ﬁlling rate m and decreasing in m+. In particular, a
more productive ﬁrm wants to achieve fast growth by oﬀering a more attractive
contract now rather than later, thus raising the current job-ﬁlling rate. Equation
(6) implicitly deﬁnes the optimal job-ﬁlling policy mx(L). Starting from L = 0,
this determines the ﬁrm’s growth path through L+ = L(1− s) +mx(L)V , where
V = V x(mx(L), L) comes from the static optimality condition (5).
An illustration how a ﬁrm grows over time is provided in Figure 1 which shows
the phase diagram in (L,m) space for the ﬁrm’s problem with recruitment costs
C(V, L, x) = xF (L)−xF (L−hV )+cV for which the optimality conditions become
especially tractable.16 Initially the ﬁrm is small and the optimal job-ﬁlling rate
16In Lemma A.3 of the Appendix we show that equations (5) and (6) simplify to only one
equation linking mt and mt+1, which is independent of Lt. This equation has a unique long-run
job-ﬁlling probability m∗ > 0 if h is low enough, and mt converges to m∗ from any initial value
m0 > 0. Employment adjusts according to Lt+1 = Lt(1 − s) +mtV x(mt, Lt). Using (5), it is
easy to see that the curve Lt+1 = Lt is downward-sloping in (L,m) space, so that the saddle
path lies above this curve when Lt < L
∗.
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exceeds the long-run rate m∗. This rate is the ﬁrm’s policy after it converges
to its long-run optimal size L∗ > 0 where it only conducts replacement hiring.
The downward-sloping saddle path depicts the ﬁrm’s policy function mx(L) and
describes the adjustment process to the long-run optimal size, along which the
ﬁrm spreads recruitment costs over time. This is in contrast to a model with
linear recruitment costs in which ﬁrms would jump directly to (L∗, m∗). In terms
of comparative statics, this example also shows that the stationary ﬁrm size and
the job-ﬁlling rates along the transition depend positively on x: a more productive
ﬁrm grows larger and oﬀers higher lifetime wages on its transition to the long-run
employment level. The following proposition and its corollaries provide broader
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Figure 1: The ﬁrm’s optimal recruitment policy follows the declining saddle path.
comparative statics results. The job-ﬁlling rate is linked via (3) to the wage oﬀer,
so that the ﬁndings carry over to the net present value of wages to new hires.17
17These characterization results depend crucially on the supermodularity of the value func-
tion, which renders this proof non-trivial. While standard techniques (Amir (1996)) can be
applied when the cost function is independent of ﬁrm size and productivity, this is not true in
general, as we discuss in Appendix A.
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Proposition 1: Consider recruitment cost functions satisfying property (C).
The ﬁrm’s value function Jx(L,W ) is strictly increasing and strictly concave
in its workforce L, strictly increasing in productivity x, strictly supermodular in
(x, L) and decreasing in the worker’s search value ρ. The job-ﬁlling rate mx(L)
is strictly increasing in productivity x and strictly decreasing in the workforce
L. Posted vacancies V x(m,L) are increasing in L and strictly increasing in the
desired job-ﬁlling rate m.
Since these results hold for any search value ρ, they also apply when this value
is determined in general equilibrium. These results imply relationships between
size, productivity, pay, and hiring:
Corollary 1: Consider recruitment cost functions satisfying property (C).
Conditional on size, more productive ﬁrms pay higher lifetime wages and have
a higher job-ﬁlling rate. Conditional on productivity, younger/smaller ﬁrms pay
higher lifetime wages and have a higher job-ﬁlling rate.
In Appendix A we also prove the following connection to ﬁrm growth rates.
Corollary 2: If recruitment costs are given by either speciﬁcation in (1) with
parameter h suﬃciently small, more productive ﬁrms have a higher growth rate,
conditional on size; and larger/older ﬁrms have a lower growth rate, conditional
on productivity.
While it already follows from (5) that vacancy postings and job-ﬁlling rates
are positively related, the two corollaries link these policies to the ﬁrm’s growth
rate. They point out that job-ﬁlling rates and ﬁrm growth rates are positively
correlated, depending positively on x and negatively on L. This cross-sectional
relationship has been highlighted recently by Davis et al. (2013), and we further
explore in Section 3 how well our model captures this quantitatively. Further-
more, since higher job-ﬁlling rates are directly associated with higher earnings for
new hires, the two corollaries also imply that faster-growing ﬁrms oﬀer higher life-
time wages. Belzil (2000) documents such patterns after controlling for size and
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worker characteristics; he shows that wages, particularly those of new hires, are
positively related to a ﬁrm’s job creation. Our ﬁndings that younger ﬁrms grow
faster (conditional on survival) and pay higher wages (to workers with the same
characteristics) are consistent with the evidence (see Haltiwanger et al. (2013),
Brown and Medoﬀ (2003) and Schmieder (2013)). Moreover, a positive wage-size
relation emerges in our model if the dispersion in productivity is large enough.18
2.2.2 General Equilibrium and Eﬃciency
Free entry of ﬁrms implies that no entrant makes a positive proﬁt, that is,
∑
x∈X
π(x)Jx(0, 0) ≤ K , (7)
with equality if entry is positive. This condition implicitly pins down the work-
ers’ job surplus ρ and therefore the relationship between wages and job-ﬁlling
rates. In a stationary equilibrium, a constant mass of N0 ﬁrms enter the market
in every period, so that there are Na = N0(1 − δ)a ﬁrms of age a in any period.
Let (Lxa, m
x
a, V
x
a , w
x
a)a≥0 be the employment/recruitment path for a ﬁrm with pro-
ductivity x. Then, a ﬁrm of age a has Lxa employed workers, and λ(m
x
a)V
x
a unem-
ployed workers are searching for jobs with oﬀered wage wxa . Therefore, the mass
of entrant ﬁrms N0 is uniquely pinned down from aggregate resource feasibility:
1 =
∑
a≥0
N0(1− δ)a
∑
x∈X
π(x)[Lxa + λ(m
x
a)V
x
a ] . (8)
This equation says that the unit mass of workers is either employed or unem-
ployed. We now deﬁne a stationary equilibrium.
18We note that enough productivity dispersion is also required in models with intra-ﬁrm
bargaining, and even more so because wages of all workers decline in a growing ﬁrm.
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Deﬁnition: A stationary competitive search equilibrium is a list(
ρ,N0, (L
x
a, m
x
a, V
x
a , w
x
a)x∈X,a≥0
)
with the following properties. Unemployed work-
ers’ job search strategies maximize utility: (3) holds for all (wxa , m
x
a). Firms’ re-
cruitment policies are optimal: (Lxa, m
x
a, V
x
a )a≥0 solve (4) for all x ∈ X. There is
free entry of ﬁrms: (7) and N0 ≥ 0 hold with complementary slackness. Aggregate
resource feasibility (8) holds.
Since the ﬁrms’ behavior has already been characterized, it remains to explore
equilibrium existence and uniqueness.
Proposition 2: A stationary competitive search equilibrium exists and is
unique. There is strictly positive ﬁrm entry provided that K is suﬃciently small.
The previous section already outlined that this model generates sensible rela-
tionships between productivity, size, growth, and job-ﬁlling rates. It is relevant
to understand whether these patterns are actually socially eﬃcient, especially
since existing models with intra-ﬁrm bargaining always entail ineﬃciencies, as
discussed in the introduction. In line with earlier literature (e.g., Moen (1997)),
we establish that a competitive search equilibrium is socially eﬃcient. A planner
who decides at each point in time about entry, vacancy postings and job ﬁlling
rates for all ﬁrms would choose exactly the same solution.
Proposition 3: The stationary competitive search equilibrium is socially op-
timal.
The eﬃciency of equilibrium can be linked to a variant of the well-known
Hosios (1990) condition.19 It says that eﬃcient job creation requires that the
19See also the Hosios condition in a large-ﬁrm model with intra-ﬁrm bargaining in Hawkins
(2014). While an appropriate version of this condition is satisﬁed in many competitive search
models, it can fail in the presence of intensive decision margins despite wage commitments;
cf. Galenianos and Kircher (2009) and Guerrieri (2008). Their eﬃciency failures seem to be
driven by intensive margins on the workers’ side (search behavior or work eﬀort), which are
not internalized by the wage contracts. In our model, extensive and intensive decision margins
are on the ﬁrms’ side and are fully internalized. This point is reminiscent of eﬃcient capacity
decisions by ﬁrms in static directed search models (cf. Geromichalos (2012) and Godenhielm
and Kultti (2014)).
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ﬁrm’s surplus share for the marginal vacancy is related to the elasticity of the
matching function. Write the workers’ search value ρ = m
λ(m)
Sw as the product
between the match probability and the worker’s job surplus Sw. Then, equation
(5) can be rewritten as
C1(V, L, x) =
1− εm,λ
εm,λ mS
w ,
where εm,λ =
λ(m)
λ′(m)m ∈ [0, 1] is the matching-function elasticity.
2.3 Productivity Shocks and Firm Dynamics
In this section we consider much richer dynamics and show that tractability is
retained. In the presence of ﬁrm-speciﬁc and aggregate productivity shocks we
cannot only explore the two margins of job creation (ﬁrm entry and ﬁrm growth),
but also the two margins of job destruction (ﬁrm exit and ﬁrm contraction). A
non-trivial endogenous exit margin arises only if operating costs f are strictly
positive; otherwise low-productivity ﬁrms rather continue with zero workers than
to exit.
The incorporation of productivity shocks allows us to study in Section 3 to
which extent the model can quantitatively account for the micro-level hetero-
geneity in the ﬁrms’ recruitment behavior and how it performs over the business
cycle. In light of the aforementioned eﬃciency result and to simplify the exposi-
tion, we start to describe and characterize the planning problem before we show
its equivalence to a competitive search equilibrium.
2.3.1 The Planning Problem
The planner decides at each point in time about ﬁrm entry and exit, layoﬀs
and hires (i.e. vacancy postings and matching probabilities) for all ﬁrm types,
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knowing that matching probability m requires λ(m) unemployed workers per
vacancy. For a ﬁrm of age a ≥ 0, let xa = (x0, . . . , xa) ∈ Xa+1 denote the
history of idiosyncratic productivity, and let zt = (z0, . . . , zt) ∈ Zt+1 be the
history of aggregate states at time t with corresponding probability ψ(zt). In
a given aggregate history zt, we denote by N(xa, zt) the mass of ﬁrms of age a
with idiosyncratic history xa. L(xa, zt) is the employment stock of any of these
ﬁrms. At every history node zt and for every ﬁrm type xa, the planner decides an
exit probability δ(xa, zt) ≥ δ0, a separation rate s(xa, zt) ≥ s0, vacancy postings
V (xa, zt) ≥ 0, and a matching probability m(xa, zt).20 The numbers of ﬁrm
types change between periods t and t+1 according to the Markov chains for the
productivities and the planner’s exit decision:
N(xa+1, zt+1) = [1− δ(xa, zt)]π(xa+1|xa)ψ(zt+1|zt)N(xa, zt) , (9)
and the workforce at any of these ﬁrms adjusts according to the planner’s sepa-
ration and hiring decisions:
L(xa+1, zt+1) = [1− s(xa, zt)]L(xa, zt) +m(xa, zt)V (xa, zt) . (10)
At time t = 0, the planner takes as given the numbers of ﬁrms that entered
the economy in some earlier period, as well as the employment stock of each of
these ﬁrms. Hence, the state vector at date 0 is summarized by the initial ﬁrm
distribution (N(xa, z0), L(xa, z0))a≥1,xa∈Xa+1. In a given history zt, the planner
20 To save on notation, we do not allow the planner to discriminate between workers with
diﬀerent ﬁrm tenure. Given that there is no learning-on-the-job, there is clearly no reason for
the planner to do so. Nonetheless, the competitive search equilibrium considered in Section 2.3.2
allows ﬁrms to treat workers in diﬀerent cohorts diﬀerently, which is necessary because ﬁrms
oﬀer contracts sequentially and are committed to these contracts. See the proof of Proposition
5 for further elaboration of this issue.
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also decides the mass of new entrants N0(z
t) ≥ 0, so that
N(x0, z
t) = π0(x0)N0(z
t) and L(x0, z
t) = 0 . (11)
The sequential planning problem is to maximize the expected discounted output
net of entry costs, opportunity costs of work, and operating and recruitment
costs:
max
δ,s,V,m,N0
∑
t≥0,zt
βtψ(zt)
{
−K(zt)N0(zt) +
∑
a≥0,xa
N(xa, zt)
[
xaztF (L(x
a, zt))
−bL(xa, zt)− f − C(V (xa, zt), L(xa, zt), xazt)
]}
, (12)
subject to the dynamic equations for N and L, namely (9), (10) and (11), and
subject to the resource constraints, for all zt ∈ Zt+1,
∑
a≥0,xa
N(xa, zt)
[
L(xa, zt) + λ(m(xa, zt))V (xa, zt)
]
≤ 1 . (13)
This constraint says that the labor force (employment plus unemployment) can-
not exceed the given unit mass of workers. We summarize a solution to the
planning problem by a vector (N,L,V,m, s, δ), with N = (N(xa, zt))a,t≥0 and
similar notation for the other variables.
We show that there is a convenient characterization of a planning solution
which says that hiring, layoﬀ and exit decisions follow a recursive equation at
the level of the individual ﬁrm. Speciﬁcally, for any existing ﬁrm, the planner
maximizes the social value of the ﬁrm, taking into account the social value of
each worker tied to the ﬁrm. This social worker value is given by the multiplier
on the resource constraint (13) which we denote by μ(zt) and which generally
depends on the initial ﬁrm distribution and on the full state history zt.
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A particularly powerful characterization can be obtained under the provision
that ﬁrm entry is positive in all states of the planning solution. When this
is the case, the social values of a worker (and thus ﬁrm-level value and policy
functions) depend only on the current aggregate state but are independent of the
state history and of the ﬁrm distribution.
To gain intuition for this ﬁnding, envision any period in which the planner
can assign unemployed workers either to existing ﬁrms or to new ﬁrms. If there
are many existing ﬁrms, there are fewer workers left to be assigned to new ﬁrms.
Nevertheless, the social value of any worker that is assigned to a new ﬁrm does
not change: Each new ﬁrm has an optimal hiring policy, and if less workers
are assigned to new ﬁrms, then proportionally less new ﬁrms will be created,
leaving the marginal value of each worker unchanged. Therefore, eﬃcient hiring
by existing ﬁrms requires their marginal social beneﬁt of hiring to be equal to
the social beneﬁt at the new ﬁrms which depends on the aggregate state alone.
To see the independence of value functions from the ﬁrm distribution formally,
suppose there are n aggregate states z ∈ Z = {z1, . . . , zn}, and let μi be the
social value of a worker in state zi. Write M = (μ1, . . . , μn) for the vector of
social values. Let G(L, x, i;M) be the social value of a ﬁrm with employment
stock L, idiosyncratic productivity x and aggregate productivity zi, satisfying the
Bellman equations
G(L, x, i;M) = max
δ,s,V,m
xziF (L)− bL− f − μi[L+ λ(m)V ]− C(V, L, xzi)
+β(1− δ)Ex,iG(L+, x+, i+;M) , (14)
where maximization is subject to L+ = (1−s)L+mV , δ ∈ [δ0, 1], s ∈ [s0, 1], m ∈
[0, 1] and V ≥ 0. The interpretation of this problem is rather straightforward.
A ﬁrm’s social value encompasses ﬂow output net of the opportunity cost of
employment, net of ﬁxed costs and recruitment costs, and net of the social cost
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of workers tied to the ﬁrm in this period; these workers include the current
workforce L and also λ(m)V unemployed workers who are searching for jobs at
this ﬁrm.
Positive entry in all aggregate states requires that the expected social value of
a new ﬁrm is equal to the entry cost,
∑
x∈X
π0(x)G(0, x, i;M) = K(zi) . (15)
This characterization of planning solutions by (G,M) is particularly helpful for
numerical applications. Despite considerable ﬁrm heterogeneity, the model can
be solved by a recursive problem on a low-dimensional state space (14) and the
(simultaneous) solution of a ﬁnite-dimensional ﬁxed-point problem (15). Im-
portantly, the distribution of ﬁrms is irrelevant for this computation. After the
corresponding policy functions have been calculated, ﬁrm entry follows as a resid-
ual of the economy’s resource constraint and does depend on the distribution of
existing ﬁrms: in every period with aggregate state i, each existing ﬁrm with
productivity x and size L attracts V (L, x, i)λ(m(L, x, i)) job seekers according
to the policy functions, while a number N0(z
t) of new ﬁrms enter to absorb the
remaining job seekers. Since job-ﬁnding prospects diﬀer between ﬁrms, the aggre-
gate job-ﬁnding rate therefore also depends on the ﬁrm distribution, as does the
evolution of aggregate employment, output and job ﬂows. As we see in the next
section, these aggregate variables in fact adjust with delay to aggregate shocks.
Because of the dependence of N0 on the distribution of employment among ex-
isting ﬁrms, it cannot generally be guaranteed that the planning solution has
positive entry in all state histories. Therefore, this property can only be checked
ex-post in simulations of the model. Analytically, we prove that any solution of
(14)–(15) which gives rise to positive entry in all state histories describes indeed
a solution to the planner’s problem. We also ﬁnd that a unique solution of these
22
equations exists for small aggregate shocks:
Proposition 4:
(a) Suppose that a solution of (14) and (15) exists with associated allocation
A = (N,L,V,m, s, δ) satisfying N(zt) > 0 for all zt. Then A is a solution
of the sequential planning problem (12).
(b) If K(z), f , and b are suﬃciently small and if z1 = . . . = zn = z, equations
(14) and (15) have a unique solution (G,M). Moreover, if the transition
matrix ψ(zj|zi) is strictly diagonally dominant and if |zi − z| is suﬃciently
small for all i, equations (14) and (15) have a unique solution.
This reduction of the planning problem permits a straightforward character-
ization of the optimal layoﬀ and hiring policies. For a growing ﬁrm, it follows
from the ﬁrst-order conditions for m and V , similar to equation (5), that
C1(V, L, xzi) = μi[mλ
′(m)− λ(m)] . (16)
As in the previous section, this equation implies an increasing relation between
matching probabilities and the number of posted vacancies at the ﬁrm. With
higher m, the planner is willing to post more vacancies at higher marginal re-
cruiting cost. Denote the solution to equation (16) by V = V (m,L, x, i), which
is positive for m > m(L, x, i). The planner’s optimal choice of m for ﬁrm (L, x)
in aggregate state i satisﬁes21
β(1− δ0)Ex,idGdL (L+, x+, i+;M) = μiλ
′(m) ,
with L+ = L(1− s0) +mV (m,L, x, i). Therefore, the ﬁrm hires if and only if
β(1− δ0)Ex,idGdL (L(1− s0), x+, i+;M) > μiλ
′(m(L, x, i)) . (17)
21Note that δ = δ0 and s = s0 if the ﬁrm hires workers.
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Conversely, the planner wants the ﬁrm to lay oﬀ workers if
Ex,i
dG
dL
(L(1− s0), x+, i+;M) < 0 . (18)
The two conditions (17) and (18) show how the ﬁrm’s policy depends on its
characteristics. Small and productive ﬁrms recruit workers and grow, whereas
large and unproductive ﬁrms dismiss workers and shrink. There is also an open
set of characteristics where ﬁrms do not adjust their workforce (cf. Bentolila and
Bertola (1990) and Elsby and Michaels (2013)).
2.3.2 Decentralization
We now show that a competitive search equilibrium gives rise to the same al-
location as the planning solution. Consider ﬁrms that oﬀer workers a sequence
of state-contingent wages, to be paid for the duration of the match. They also
commit to cohort-speciﬁc and state-contingent retention probabilities. Contracts
are contingent on the idiosyncratic productivity history of the ﬁrm at age k, xk,
and on the aggregate state history zt at time t. Formally, a contract oﬀered by a
ﬁrm of age a at time T takes the form
Ca =
(
wa(x
k, zt), ϕa(x
k, zt)
)
k>a,t=T+k−a
,
where wa(x
k, zt) is the wage paid to the worker in history (xk, zt), conditional on
the worker being still employed by the ﬁrm in that instant. ϕa(x
k, zt), for k > a,
is the probability of retaining the worker at the end of the period, so 1−ϕa(xk, zt)
is the separation probability.
In Appendix B, we describe the workers’ and the ﬁrms’ search problems and
we deﬁne a competitive search equilibrium, analogously to the stationary model.
We also prove the following welfare theorem.
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Proposition 5: A competitive search equilibrium is socially optimal.
It is not hard to see that a wage commitment is suﬃcient for a ﬁrm to im-
plement its desired policy, even if it cannot commit to retention rates. Given
risk neutrality, the ﬁrm can set the wages following any future history exactly
equal to the reservation wage (i.e. the ﬂow value of unemployment) which is the
sum of unemployment income and the worker’s shadow value, b + μ(zt). It can
achieve any initial transfer to attract workers through a hiring bonus. In this
decentralization, the costs of an existing worker are always equal to his social
value in the alternative: unemployment and search for another job. Since the
ﬂow surplus for any retained worker equals his shadow value, the ﬁrm’s problem
in this case coincides with the planner’s problem, so that ﬁring and exiting will
be exactly up to the socially optimal level even though the ﬁrm does not commit
to retention rates. Workers do not have any incentive to quit the job unilaterally,
either, because they are exactly compensated for their social shadow value from
searching. If the workers also cannot commit to stay, this is the unique wage
policy that overcomes the commitment problem on both sides of the market and
implements the socially eﬃcient outcome. Alternatively, even a slight degree of
risk aversion on the workers’ side would give rise to ﬂat wage proﬁles to oﬀer
insurance (cf. Rudanko (2011)). This clariﬁes that the current model determines
surplus sharing only, whereas the time path of payments depends on additional
details, like the ability to commit to speciﬁc actions (see Schaal (2012) for a
related point).
2.4 Extensions
This framework delivers propositions for the cross-section and for the business
cycle under a rich structure of heterogeneity on the side of ﬁrms. It abstracts
from a similar richness on the side of the workers, and this section discusses two
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particular concerns: worker heterogeneity and on-the-job search. Both might be
important to capture realistic wage distributions that may be understated in our
setup. They might also aﬀect the costs and beneﬁts of posting vacancies, since
higher wages can attract not only more but also better workers and can induce
them to stay longer. While such extensions go beyond the scope of this analysis,
the following sketches how they could be integrated into this framework. We also
clarify that eﬃciency is not crucial for our tractability results.
Heterogeneity in worker types requires three adjustments to our setup: pro-
duction functions that accommodate worker heterogeneity; recruitment costs that
may be type-dependent; and contract oﬀers that condition on worker type.22 We
expect an analogue of our steady-state result when costs are type-dependent:
More workers of a particular type can be hired via more vacancies for this type
or via higher wages which attract more of these workers, and curvature in the
cost function implies that ﬁrms will use both margins. Aggregation across types
requires further investigation, but technically we expect no particular diﬃculties.
With aggregate shocks a major technical simpliﬁcation of our setup arises
since the value of an unemployed worker tracks the current state of aggregate
productivity, independent of the distribution of employment across ﬁrms. This
is driven by entrant ﬁrms which absorb workers. With worker heterogeneity, a
similar simpliﬁcation can be expected if there is a separate ﬁrm entry margin for
each worker type. If ﬁrms specialize on one worker type only, a separate entry
condition for each type arises. For each type the economy can then be solved
as in this paper. Firms may prefer to specialize even if multiple types of hires
are technologically feasible. Eeckhout and Kircher (2012) lay out a tractable
production technology and conditions for sorting in a frictionless economy, and
22If contracts cannot condition on worker types, either because of contractual incompleteness
or imperfect information at the hiring stage, we enter a world of adverse selection which requires
a diﬀerent approach; see Guerrieri et al. (2010).
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with more stringent conditions on the gains from specialization an extension
of their result might carry over to this setting. While specialized ﬁrms clearly
generate tractability, this is not necessary and a much milder requirement should
suﬃce: if ﬁrms specialize only in the entry period (and subsequently hire other
types), we expect the simpliﬁcation to carry over, as long as there is a separate
entry margin per worker type.
Another extension is to add on-the-job search to our basic setup, similar to
Schaal (2012) and Garibaldi et al. (2014). As discussed in the introduction, the
former assumes linear vacancy costs, which implies that ﬁrms always jump to
their optimal sizes. The latter assume linear output in combination with convex
costs and focus on steady states: Firms grow each period by exactly the same
amount and never cease to grow until they exit exogenously. Neither paper
considers convex recruitment costs and business cycles. When ﬁrms can hire
unemployed or employed workers, this is akin to worker heterogeneity, and, as
described above, an entry margin for each level of heterogeneity is important for
tractability. We conjecture that entrants’ choice of productivity x at cost K(x)
would give rise to such a specialized entry.23
Finally, we note that eﬃciency is not crucial for tractability. Tractability arises
when workers can choose to apply to new ﬁrms and there is entry of such ﬁrms.
The former implies that the utility value of an unemployed worker is linked to new
entrants, and the latter ties this to the entry costs. These remain present, e.g.,
when workers are risk averse. In this case our analysis gives the benchmark of
23Employed workers are similar to unemployed workers, except that their existing job provides
them with a better outside option. Therefore, when comparing job-ﬁnding probabilities and
wages, they value the latter more. On the ﬁrm side, high-productivity ﬁrms care more about
hiring probabilities than about wages. This suggests that high-productivity ﬁrms specialize on
workers whose current level of pay is high. The exact details depend on whether contracts can
condition on the worker’s search behavior. Our general contract space allows for back-loaded
wages, which tend to be important to reduce ineﬃciencies associated with on-the-job search.
See Section 2.3.2 for more details on how to solve commitment problems in our setting, and
Schaal (2012) for a longer discussion and literature review in the context of on-the-job search.
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perfect insurance markets. In the absence of private or public insurance, workers
search too much for low-paying but easy-to-get jobs (as in Acemoglu and Shimer
(1999)), leading to excess employment in low-productivity ﬁrms and therefore to
a misallocation of labor among heterogeneous ﬁrms. This can be studied in a
tractable manner in an adaptation of our framework.
3 Quantitative Exploration
The previous section outlined that this model can capture important features
at the micro level (e.g. varying job-ﬁlling rates) and it is tractable for studying
business cycle dynamics with potentially sluggish adjustment of aggregate vari-
ables. In this section we calibrate our model to the U.S. labor market in order to
investigate how well it is able to quantitatively account for the main features in
the data. We ﬁrst explore the model’s cross-sectional properties, showing among
other results how it generates diﬀerential job-ﬁlling rates as in Davis et al. (2013).
We then show that the same parameterizations give rise to aggregate sluggishness
and other business cycle features. We conclude with a short exploration of the
eﬀects of hiring credits for business-cycle stabilization.
3.1 Calibration
We brieﬂy sketch the model calibration, referring to Appendix C for more de-
tails. The parameter choices are summarized in Table 1. We calibrate the model
at weekly frequency and choose ﬁrm-speciﬁc permanent productivities (xi0) and
shares at entry (σi) to match the ﬁrm and employment shares of the Census Bu-
reau’s Business Dynamics Statistics (BDS) for the ﬁve size classes 1−49, 50−249,
250−999, 1000−9999 and ≥ 10000.24 Exit probabilities (δi) are chosen to match
24We calibrate the model to match the size distribution of ﬁrms (rather than establishments).
We note that those results relating to establishment-level statistics (e.g. Figure 3) are robust
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annual ﬁrm exit rates from the BDS. To capture some features of employment
dynamics, we also have a transitory component x1 of ﬁrm productivity which
is redrawn from interval [1 − x, 1 + x] with probability π in each period. The
returns-to-scale parameter α in the production function x0x1L
α is calibrated to
yield a plausible labor income share.
Table 1: Parameter choices in the benchmark calibration.
Parameter Value Description
β 0.999 Annual interest rate 5%
k 6.276 Matching function scale parameter
r 1.057 Matching function elasticity parameter
α 0.7 Production function elasticity
c 8.317 Recruitment cost scale parameter
γ 2 Recruitment cost elasticity parameter
(xi0) (.366, .736, 1.166, 2.031, 4.138) Employment shares (5 size classes)
(σi) (98.82, 1.0, .153, .025, .002)% Firm shares (5 size classes)
(δi) (1.71, .27, .16, .088, .016)  Exit rates
x 0.312 Transitory productivity range
π 0.027 Adjustment probability
b 0.1 Unemployment income (b/w ≈ 0.7)
K 329.6 Entry cost
s0 0.48% Quit rate
For the recruitment technology, we choose the employment-scaled form25
C(V, L, x) = c
1+γ
(V
L
)γV . In our benchmark calibration we take a cubic function
(γ = 2). While this relates to Merz and Yashiv (2007) who estimate a similar
cubic hiring technology,26 we take an agnostic view about this parameter value.
Therefore, we compare the benchmark results with those obtained with a nearly
linear recruitment technology (γ = 0.1) and with a much higher elasticity (γ = 8).
when we restrict the model sample to the ﬁrst three size classes which largely represent one-
establishment businesses.
25To avoid division by zero at entrant ﬁrms, we assume that actual labor input L˜ = 1+L is
the sum of the labor inputs of the (single) owner and of the employed workers.
26As mentioned before (footnote 7), their estimation results are not applicable to our model.
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In all versions, the scale parameter c is calibrated to match our target for the
weekly job-ﬁlling rate.
Unemployment income b is set at roughly 0.7 of the average wage which cor-
responds to the calibrated value of non-market work chosen by Hall and Mil-
grom (2008) and Pissarides (2009). Since wages are rather close to the average
employment-weighted marginal product, this unemployment value equals 67 per-
cent of marginal product and 47 percent of labor productivity. As this value
of b implies rather small labor market responses to aggregate shocks, we also
consider a much higher unemployment value, namely 97.7 percent of the average
wage which corresponds to the choice of Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008) and
generates more ampliﬁcation. While we report the cross-sectional results for the
benchmark value of b, further robustness regarding this parameter, as well as
regarding the returns-to-scale parameter, is explored in Appendix D.
3.2 Cross-Sectional Implications
We ﬁrst simulate the model for a stationary cross-section of ﬁrms. Besides match-
ing the calibration targets, our model generates negative relationships between
ﬁrm size and the shares of younger ﬁrms in the cross-sectional distribution (see
Table 2) which are roughly in line with the data. Particularly, the model can
generate the observation that a substantial share of large ﬁrms is rather young
which indicates that some ﬁrms are able to grow quickly (cf. Luttmer (2011)).
This is also conﬁrmed in Figure 2 which shows that the model does a good job
in matching the ﬁrm-age distribution.
Our model can also account for the observation that job creation and destruc-
tion rates are falling in ﬁrm size, although less strongly than in the data. Similar
negative relationships between ﬁrm size and job ﬂows are obtained at entrant
and exiting ﬁrms (see Table 6 in Appendix C). Table 3 shows the distribution of
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Table 2: Firm size and employment distribution
Size class 1–49 50–249 250–999 1000–9999 ≥ 10000
Data
Firm shares 95.62 3.64 0.54 0.17 0.02
Employment shares 29.31 16.23 10.88 17.64 25.93
% younger than 2 yrs. 24.68 7.24 4.38 2.26 1.08
% younger than 5 yrs. 39.71 16.88 10.19 5.35 3.65
% younger than 10 yrs. 57.76 31.30 20.23 12.01 7.14
Model
Firm shares 95.85 3.41 0.55 0.17 0.02
Employment shares 29.77 15.71 11.33 18.78 24.41
% younger than 2 yrs. 16.16 2.99 2.35 1.77 1.48
% younger than 5 yrs. 35.53 8.46 6.96 5.32 4.62
% younger than 10 yrs. 58.31 16.88 13.92 11.11 9.85
Notes: The top two rows report ﬁrm and employment shares in ﬁve size classes (calibrated).
The bottom rows are the shares of younger ﬁrms in these classes. Data statistics are from the
Business Dynamics Statistics of the Census Bureau for the year 2005. Model statistics are from
a cross section of 4.9 · 106 ﬁrms for the benchmark model (γ = 2).
quarterly employment growth rates across ﬁrms. Our model performs reasonably
well in reproducing the overall pattern that more than half of employment is at
ﬁrms that grow or shrink by more than ﬁve percent in a quarter.
One dimension of particular interest is the relationship between employment
growth, the vacancy rate and the vacancy yield, which are positively related for
growing ﬁrms in the Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey (JOLTS), see
Davis et al. (2013). This indicates that the matching rate varies across ﬁrms, a
feature that is not present in most standard models. To see whether our model
can trace this relationship quantitatively, we calculate monthly model statistics
for hires, vacancies, layoﬀs and employment growth rates.27 Figure 3 shows the
27When Lt−1 and Vt−1 denotes employment and vacancies at the end of month t− 1 and Ht
are hires during month t, the hires rate is ht = Ht/Lt−1, the vacancy rate is vrt−1 = Vt−1/Lt−1
and the vacancy yield is vyt = Ht/Vt−1, so that ht = v
r
t−1v
y
t . We use this deﬁnition, which is
slightly diﬀerent from Davis et al. (2013), for the model and data statistics. We are grateful to
Jason Faberman for providing these data.
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Figure 2: Cross-sectional relationships between ﬁrm age in years and
ﬁrm/employment shares. The dashed curves are from the Business Dynamics
Statistics of the Census Bureau for the year 2005. Model statistics (solid) are
from a cross section of 4.9 · 106 ﬁrms for the benchmark model (γ = 2).
cross-sectional relationships from the data and for the three parameterizations
of our model.28 In the data, ﬁrms grow larger both by posting more vacancies
and by ﬁlling vacancies faster, with the vacancy yield accounting for most of the
variation. The benchmark calibration with a cubic recruitment cost function can
account for around two thirds of the observed variation in vacancy yields (see
the blue (solid) curve in the upper right graph). Employers that expand more
rapidly oﬀer more attractive contracts and ﬁll these vacancies faster. There can
be many diﬀerent reasons why vacancy yields are higher in faster-growing ﬁrms.
For example, strongly expanding ﬁrms may search more intensively or they may
use alternative recruitment channels. Time aggregation can also account for
part of this variation; see Davis et al. (2013) for a discussion. Our benchmark
results suggest that competitive search can be one important, but perhaps not
the only, mechanism responsible for the observed heterogeneity in vacancy yields
and vacancy rates.29
28To smooth the relationships, all ﬁgures in the graphs are calculated as ﬁve-bin centered
moving averages, as in Davis et al. (2013).
29Venkateswaran (2013) considers idiosyncratic shocks to the matching technology to account
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Table 3: Distribution of employment growth
Growth rate interval Data Model (γ = 2)
-2 (exit) 0.7 0.4
(−2,−0.2] 7.5 8.8
(−0.2,−0.05] 16.5 16.3
(−0.05,−0.02] 9.6 5.0
(−0.02, 0.02) 30.9 31.4
[0.02, 0.05) 9.9 8.9
[0.05, 0.2) 16.7 16.1
[0.2, 2) 7.5 13.1
2 (entry) 0.7 0.1
Notes: The table reports employment shares for intervals of quarterly employment growth
rates. The empirical distribution is taken from Table 2 of Davis et al. (2010). Model statistics
are calculated for the benchmark calibration from a cross-section of 4.9 · 106 ﬁrms.
Figure 3 further shows the results for the nearly linear recruitment technology
(γ = 0.1) and for the one with higher curvature (γ = 8). With linear vacancy
costs, weekly vacancy yields m are constant and hence do not vary with employ-
ment growth. Variations in the monthly vacancy yield are solely explained by
time aggregation. The green (dotted) curve in the upper right graph of Figure 3
shows that the vacancy yield is indeed nearly ﬂat for employment growth below
20 percent. Time aggregation (i.e., ﬁrms post and ﬁll unrecorded vacancies dur-
ing the month) accounts for the variation in vacancy yields beyond that point.
On the other hand, as indicated by the red (closely dashed) curves in the ﬁgure,
our model can principally account for the full variation in vacancy yields and
vacancy rates if the curvature of the recruitment technology is suﬃciently large.
On a related note, Davis et al. (2013) show that vacancy yields (and vacancy
rates) vary substantially by industry and employer size groups. While we have
for the correlation between employment growth and vacancy yields. To what extent fast-growing
ﬁrms use higher wages to ﬁll their jobs faster cannot be answered for US ﬁrms due to lack of
ﬁrm-level wage data. It should be interesting, however, to explore this question for European
countries where matched employer-employee data (combined with ﬁrm-level vacancy numbers)
are available.
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Figure 3: Cross-sectional relationships between monthly employment growth and
the vacancy rate, the vacancy yield, the hires rate and the layoﬀ rate. The dashed
curves (in the ﬁrst three graphs) are from the data used in Davis et al. (2013),
the blue (solid) curves are for the model with cubic recruitment costs (γ = 2),
the green (dotted) curves are for γ = 0.1 and the red (closely dashed) curves are
for γ = 8. Model statistics are calculated from a cross-section of 4.9 · 106 ﬁrms.
not introduced industry-speciﬁc parameters into our model, we can study the
eﬀect of size and ﬁnd that smaller employers indeed have higher vacancy yields,
albeit the variation is smaller than in the data. Speciﬁcally, in our benchmark
calibration the vacancy yield at ﬁrms with less than 50 workers exceeds the one at
ﬁrms with more than 500 workers by 10 percent, while in the data the diﬀerence
is almost a factor of two.30
30We expect that more ﬂexible forms of the recruitment technology should give larger varia-
tion by employer size: for instance, if C had decreasing returns in (V, L), vacancy postings in
larger ﬁrms would be less costly so that these ﬁrms prefer to recruit less intensively, reducing
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The bottom graphs in Figure 3 show that our model largely accounts for the
relationships between employment growth, hires rates and layoﬀ rates, both for
growing and for shrinking ﬁrms, and regardless of the curvature parameter in the
recruitment technology.31
3.3 The Business Cycle
To explore business cycle dynamics, we feed in aggregate productivity shocks and
solve the model as outlined in Section 2.3.1. Here we compare two parameteriza-
tions of this model, one with the benchmark value of unemployment income and
the other with a higher value of b (see the previous discussion). The aggregate
productivity parameter can attain one of ﬁve equally distant values in the interval
[zmin, 2 − zmin], and the Markov process for z is a mean–reverting process with
transition probability ψ, as described in Appendix C of Shimer (2005). The two
parameters (zmin, ψ) = (0.93, 0.015) are set to match a quarterly standard devi-
ation and autocorrelation of labor productivity around trend of 0.015 and 0.76.
We allow the entry cost K to vary with the aggregate state, so as to stabilize the
volatility of job creation at opening ﬁrms. For further details, see Appendix C.
Table 4 shows the outcome of this experiment for volatility and comovement
with aggregate output. While both parameterizations reproduce the observed co-
movement with output, only the calibration with high opportunity cost of work is
able to generate ampliﬁcation of labor market variables which is of a similar order
of magnitude as in the data. Relative to a model with homogeneous ﬁrms (Hage-
dorn and Manovskii (2008)), ﬁrm heterogeneity and decreasing returns seem to
add no more ampliﬁcation.32 In terms of correlation patterns, our model pro-
job-ﬁlling rates further.
31For the empirical relationship between employment growth and layoﬀs, see Davis et al.
(2010) who ﬁnd that layoﬀs dominate quits for large employment contractions. In our model,
the quit rate is exogenous at s0 so that variations in layoﬀs necessarily capture all variations
in separations.
32This is consistent with Krause and Lubik (2007), Faccini and Ortigueira (2010) and Hawkins
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duces procyclical job-ﬁnding rates and countercyclical separation rates. We also
note that the correlation between labor productivity and the job-ﬁnding rate is
positive but imperfect. This contrasts with Shimer’s (2005) calibration of the
standard search and matching model with homogeneous ﬁrms where this corre-
lation is perfect, and we will elaborate below on diﬀerences in the propagation of
shocks.33
Table 4: Business cycle statistics
Data Model (low b) Model (high b)
Rel. Corr. w. Rel. Corr. w. Rel. Corr. w.
vol. output vol. output vol. output
Productivity 0.67 0.885 0.93 0.970 0.66 0.930
Unemployment 6.55 -0.829 2.88 -0.381 6.16 -0.827
Vacancies 6.81 0.428 1.20 0.390 3.93 0.506
Job–ﬁnding rate 3.86 0.812 1.15 0.484 3.06 0.884
Separation rate 2.67 -0.575 2.66 -0.230 3.39 -0.782
Vacancy yield 5.88 -0.790 1.54 -0.639 4.80 -0.941
Recruiting intensity 1.00 0.871 0.56 0.340 1.37 0.841
Notes: All variables are logged and HP ﬁltered with parameter 1600. Relative volatility
measures the standard deviation of a variable divided by the standard deviation of output.
Data are for the U.S. labor market (1951-2011), except the job–ﬁnding rate and separation
rate series (1951-2007) which were constructed by Robert Shimer (see Shimer (2012) and his
webpage http://sites.google.com/site/robertshimer/research/ﬂows) and the vacancy yields and
recruiting intensity series (2001-2011) which were constructed by Davis et al. (2013). Monthly
series are converted in quarterly series by time averaging. The model statistics are obtained
from 20 simulations of 5 · 105 ﬁrms over a period of 2080 weeks. Weekly series are converted
into quarterly series by time averaging.
The last two rows of Table 4 show that our model captures the volatility and
comovement of the aggregate vacancy yield and of the recruiting intensity as
calculated by Davis et al. (2013) for JOLTS data, 2001-2011. In particular, we
(2011) who obtain little ampliﬁcation of technology shocks in labor market models with multi-
worker ﬁrms and intra-ﬁrm bargaining.
33The model correlations between labor productivity and the job-ﬁnding rate are 0.30 (low
b) and 0.79 (high b), while the data counterpart (1951–2007) is 0.56.
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can decompose the aggregate vacancy yield as
H
V
= m˜(λ)
∑
i
mi
m˜(λ)
Vi
V
≡ m˜(λ)r , (19)
where H , V are aggregate hires and vacancies, λ is the aggregate unemployment-
vacancy ratio, m˜ is the reduced-form matching function (that is, the inverse of
λ(.), cf. footnote 10), and (mi, Vi) are recruitment policies of ﬁrm i. Since λ is
countercyclical, so is the aggregate vacancy yield, although less than a standard
aggregate matching function would predict. The term r in equation (19) is a
measure of the (vacancy-weighted) “recruiting intensity” which turns out to be
procyclical, both in the data and in the model with γ = 2.34 The reason why
r is procyclical in our model is that m˜ is concave and that the cross-sectional
dispersion of λi (mi) is countercyclical.
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To give a brief impression of the cyclicality of wages we have to take a stance on
the wage proﬁle over time. Although our theory determines mainly the present
value of wages, consider ﬂat wage contracts as an empirically relevant special
case. With this speciﬁcation, we ﬁnd that aggregate wages are procyclical and
rigid, while wages for new hires are more volatile. In particular, the elasticity
of wages for all workers (new hires) with respect to productivity is 0.06 (0.60)
for the calibration with high unemployment income, which compares with the
estimates of Haefke et al. (2013) who report elasticities in the range 0.1-0.3 (0.6-
1). Other implementations are clearly conceivable that would give rise to greater
wage cyclicality, but it is good to know that our model can account for substantial
wage rigidity.
34Our measure of the recruiting intensity corresponds to the variable q1−αt in equation (9) of
Davis et al. (2013). We set α = 0.5 as in their paper to calculate the moments in Table 4.
35This seems consistent with the observation of Davis et al. (2012) that the cross-industry
dispersion of job-ﬁlling rates increased during the Great Recession. We note that the procycli-
cality of r vanishes in our model with nearly linear recruitment costs (γ = 0.1) because all ﬁrms
ﬁll vacancies at the same matching rate.
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Finally, we illustrate the role of recruitment frictions for propagation of ag-
gregate shocks by considering the model response to a permanent increase in the
aggregate productivity parameter by one percent. In response to such a shock,
we let entry costs increase by the same factor.36 The new steady-state equilib-
rium features more ﬁrms and higher aggregate output. In Figure 4, we compare
impulse responses for the three calibrations with diﬀerent curvature parameters,
where unemployment income is set to the high value. Relative to the model with
nearly linear recruitment costs, convex costs generate a pronounced labor market
propagation, featuring sluggish adjustments of the job–ﬁnding rate and of the
vacancy–unemployment ratio, which are similar to the responses of these vari-
ables to a permanent productivity shock in vector autoregressions (see Appendix
E for details). Fujita and Ramey (2007) and Shimer (2005) argue that standard
search and matching models cannot generate such patterns because market tight-
ness and the job-ﬁnding rate are jump variables which correlate perfectly with
aggregate productivity.37 The bottom graphs in Figure 4 show that this is also
true in our model when vacancy costs are linear,38 but not when they are convex
in which case both variables lag behind aggregate productivity by 2-3 quarters.
We emphasize that the sluggish model dynamics come about for the same pa-
rameterizations of the recruitment technology which also give rise to plausible
variations of vacancy yields across ﬁrms. Micro-level features are thus directly
linked to the dynamics at the aggregate level. Lagged responses to productiv-
36Without the proportional increase in entry costs, ﬁrm entry would exhibit an implausible
spike at the time of the shock. There are many reasons why entry costs vary with the business
cycle, e.g. procyclical rental rates, capital prices, or outside opportunities of entrepreneurs.
Regarding the latter, endogenous entrepreneurship could be easily introduced in our framework
when unemployed workers have the option to either search for jobs or to start a business. We
expect that eﬃciency and tractability would be preserved.
37There may be other departures from the standard model that break this result. By adding
worker heterogeneity, for example, the composition of workers in the unemployment pool de-
termines the aggregate job-ﬁnding rate (cf. Robin (2011)) which may contribute to persistent
dynamics.
38Equation (16) implies that m is a function of the aggregate state μi alone if marginal
vacancy costs are constant.
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Figure 4: Impulse response to a permanent 1% increase in aggregate productivity.
The dashed curves are responses from a VAR for U.S. data (see Appendix E for
details), the blue (solid) curves are for the model with cubic recruitment costs
(γ = 2), the green (dotted) curves are for γ = 0.1 and the red (closely dashed)
curves are for γ = 8. All three versions have unemployment income b ≈ 0.977 ·w.
ity shocks are neither picked up by most (homogeneous worker) random search
models, nor by existing models with directed search, such as Shi (2009), Menzio
and Shi (2010, 2011), and Schaal (2012). In our model, convexity of recruitment
technologies in combination with the entry of new ﬁrms contribute to the delayed
response of the labor market: the positive shock triggers a surge of entrant ﬁrms
who create only few jobs when they are small but more as they grow larger. With
linear recruitment costs, all ﬁrms (young and old) would directly jump to their
optimal sizes.
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3.4 Policy Experiment: The Eﬀects of Hiring Subsidies
We provide some ﬁrst exploration of the positive implications of policy inter-
ventions in our environment. Despite eﬃciency of the laissez-faire equilibrium
in this model with risk-neutral workers, a social planner with inequality aver-
sion and absent suﬃcient redistributive instruments would want to distort the
ﬁrst-best outcome so as to reduce unemployment. Alternatively, a policy maker
with a direct concern about aggregate unemployment (or output) would have an
interest to intervene, possibly in a cyclical way. We focus on hiring subsidies
(hiring credits) which have been extensively deployed to stimulate job growth in
past recessions and have received renewed attention during the Great Recession.39
It might be conjectured that they stabilize business cycle ﬂuctuations, especially
when they are used in a counter-cyclical manner. However, we ﬁnd that this is not
the case. We compare time-invariant and counter-cyclical subsidies, ﬁnanced by
lump-sum taxes. The model is solved as the solution to a quasi-planner’s problem
who maximizes social welfare subject to given government policy (cf. Veracierto
(2008)). We set the subsidy per hire to 0.015 which corresponds to 3.4% of a
monthly wage so that government expenditures on hiring subsidies are 0.1 per-
cent of output. With a counter-cyclical policy, hiring ﬁrms receive the subsidy
only when the aggregate productivity state is below its mean. Since our model
calibration with a high value of unemployment beneﬁts generates more plausible
aggregate dynamics, we use this calibrated version for the policy experiments.
Table 5 shows the outcome of the policy simulations. While both policies suc-
ceed in stabilizing the job-ﬁnding rate to some extent, they considerably increase
the volatility of separations, so that they are not successful to stabilize unemploy-
ment ﬂuctuations. Perhaps surprisingly, the destabilizing forces are stronger for
39The Hiring Incentives to Restore Employment Act (HIRE) of 2010 includes tax exemptions
from employer social security contributions and business income tax breaks for workers hired
from unemployment; hiring credits were also an element of the American Jobs Act proposed
by the Obama administration in 2011. For an overview, see Neumark (2013).
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the counter-cyclical policy which ultimately yields higher unemployment volatil-
ity compared to a laissez-faire situation.
Table 5: Business cycle eﬀects of hiring subsidies
Laissez Stationary Cyclical
faire policy policy
Unemployment 15.5 15.5 16.3
Vacancies 9.8 7.1 8.2
Output 2.5 2.4 2.4
Job–ﬁnding rate 7.7 6.0 6.0
Separation rate 8.5 11.2 11.8
Notes: The table reports the standard deviations of logged and HP ﬁltered (parameter 1600)
quarterly variables, where model statistics are obtained as in Table 4.
The intuition for these ﬁndings is that hiring subsidies make ﬁrms more prone
to ﬁre their employees in adverse idiosyncratic or aggregate states, i.e., labor
hoarding is less beneﬁcial. Firms optimally decide to lay oﬀ more workers since
wages increase in response to the policy, which happens because entrant ﬁrms
continue to make zero expected proﬁts and the subsidy gets passed through into
increased wages. Higher wages make ﬁrms more eager to ﬁre in bad states and
the subsidy makes them more eager to hire in good states. Even in steady state
with only idiosyncratic shocks, both the separation and the hiring rate increase
by 8 percent in response to the (time-invariant) policy, which results in more
worker reallocation between employment and unemployment, so that the steady-
state unemployment rate increases by half a percentage point. Over the business
cycle, time-invariant hiring subsidies induce ﬁrms to ﬁre more workers for any
given productivity level, because wages rise in all aggregate states. This is illus-
trated in Figure 5(a) which shows the employment growth policy of a particular
ﬁrm (the one with median transitory and permanent idiosyncratic productivity),
both in the lowest and in the highest aggregate state. For a given employment
level, separations are higher under the policy (dashed curves) than under laissez
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faire (solid curves). At the same time, ﬁrms grow to a smaller size in the low-
productivity state, though not in the high-productivity state. This explains why
separations are more volatile under the stationary policy compared to laissez-
faire. The volatility of separations increases further under the cyclical policy
which leads to higher wages in the lowest aggregate states only. Hence ﬁrms ﬁnd
it optimal to lay oﬀ more workers during recessions and fewer workers during
booms, which is shown in Figure 5(b) where separations increase only in the
low-productivity state.
(a) Stationary policy (b) Cyclical policy
Figure 5: Employment growth for varying employment levels of an exemplary
ﬁrm in the lowest and in the highest aggregate productivity state. The solid
(blue) curves are under laissez faire. The dashed (red) curves are with stationary
hiring subsidies (left graph) and with cyclical subsidies (right graph).
These ﬁndings suggest that hiring subsidies are not particularly useful to sta-
bilize the cycle, at least when they are not accompanied by additional policies
aiming to dampen separations during recessions. More work on these issues will
obviously be needed to explore the impact of such policies in broader environ-
ments.
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4 Conclusions
This paper investigates job reallocation in a model where ﬁrms actively com-
pete for workers in a frictional labor market. Meaningful dynamics arise when
ﬁrms cannot instantly post vacancies at constant marginal costs - for example
because existing workers are required for recruitment. Firms that want to ex-
pand quickly are willing to pay higher salaries to attract more workers and hence
ﬁll vacancies faster. Matching rates are therefore not an aggregate object, as
in most of the search literature, but are ﬁrm-speciﬁc as recently documented by
Davis et al. (2013). Calibrated versions of the model show that it can account
for this variation in vacancy yields, alongside other cross-sectional features. The
same reasons that induce ﬁrms to vary their vacancy yields also induce delayed
aggregate responses of key labor market variables to productivity shocks.
These applied contributions are derived within a model that extends com-
petitive search to a setting with large ﬁrms that face decreasing returns in pro-
duction and convex costs in recruitment. This model provides an alternative
to the current workhorse models for large ﬁrms in search markets which are
based on random search and bargaining. We establish substantial diﬀerences be-
tween these environments: Competition for workers induces ﬁrm-speciﬁc match-
ing rates, while they are identical in random-search models. Multi-worker ﬁrms
in that environment always engage in ineﬃcient hiring, whereas we show that
our setting retains the eﬃciency properties known from wage competition among
single-worker ﬁrms. Finally, our model remains tractable both in and out of
steady state, which makes it useful for applied purposes. All our insights apply
equivalently to a model where workers are risk averse but have access to full
insurance markets. As discussed in the extensions, we expect our main tools
to be applicable in the absence of such insurance markets, albeit at the loss of
eﬃciency. Such an extension would make policy analysis more relevant.
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Appendix A: Proofs
Proposition 1: Consider recruitment cost functions satisfying property (C). The
ﬁrm’s value function Jx(L,W ) is strictly increasing and strictly concave in its workforce
L, strictly increasing in productivity x, strictly supermodular in (x,L) and decreasing
in the worker’s search value ρ. The job-ﬁlling rate mx(L) is strictly increasing in pro-
ductivity x and strictly decreasing in the workforce L. Posted vacancies V x(m,L) are
increasing in L and strictly increasing in the desired job-ﬁlling rate m.
Proof of Proposition 1:
Rewrite problem (4) to express the dependence of the value function on x and on the
workers’ search value ρ as the solution to the dynamic programming problem
J(L, x; ρ) = max
(m,V )≥0
xF (L)− C(V,L, x)−D(m; ρ)V + β(1 − δ)J(L+, x; ρ)
s.t. L+ = L(1− s) +mV , (20)
where function D(m; ρ) is deﬁned in the text. It is increasing, strictly convex in m
and increasing in ρ. This problem is equivalently deﬁned on a compact state space
L ∈ [0, L] where L is so large that it never binds. This is possible because of the Inada
condition limL→∞ F ′(L) = 0. The RHS in problem (20) deﬁnes an operator T which
maps a continuous function J0(L, x; ρ), deﬁned on S = [0, L] × [0, x] × [0, ρ] into a
continuous function J1(L, x; ρ) = T (J0)(L, x; ρ) deﬁned on the same domain. Here x
and ρ are arbitrary upper bounds on x and ρ. Operator T is a contraction, therefore
there exists a unique ﬁxed point J∗ which is a continuous function and which is the
limit of any sequence Jn deﬁned by Jn = T (Jn−1).
Starting from a continuous J0 that is diﬀerentiable and weakly increasing in L and x
and weakly decreasing in ρ, successive application of T yields a sequence Jn where each
element shares these properties. Since the subset of continuous functions on S that
are weakly increasing in L and x and weakly decreasing in ρ is closed under the sup
norm, the limit J∗ of sequence Jn is in this set. Because xF (L)−C(V,L, x) is strictly
increasing in (L, x) and since D(m; ρ) is strictly increasing in ρ, the limit J∗ is strictly
increasing in x and L and strictly decreasing in ρ.
We show in subsequent Lemmata A.1 and A.2 that T maps functions that are diﬀer-
entiable and concave in L and supermodular in L and x into functions with the same
properties. Since the subset of concave and supermodular functions is closed, the same
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arguments as above imply that the unique ﬁxed point J∗ is concave in L and super-
modular in (L, x). Since function xF (L) − C(V,L, x) is strictly concave in L, J∗ is
also strictly concave in L. Concavity in L and diﬀerentiability of xF (L) − C(V,L, x)
together with the theorem of Benveniste and Scheinkman establishes diﬀerentiability
of J∗ in L.
Before we establish the remaining results, rewrite (20) in terms of hirings H = mV .
Dropping argument ρ from J , we can equivalently write (20) as
J(L, x) = max
H
xF (L)− C(H,L, x) + β(1− δ)J(L(1 − s) +H,x) (21)
where
C(H,L, x) ≡ min
m
C
(
H
m,L, x
)
+D(m)
H
m
. (22)
The right hand side of (21) is an equivalent expression of the ﬁxed-point operator T.
As will become clear, the per period return xF (L) − C(H,L, x) is supermodular in
(L,H), but when C13 > 0 (which arises in ﬁrst speciﬁcation in (1) for h > 0) the
per period return is strictly submodular in (H,x) and in (L+, x) when one writes
H = L+− (1− s)L, which renders standard tools to prove supermodularity (e.g., Amir
(1996)) inapplicable. To proceed, the optimality condition for problem (22) is
C1
(
H
m,L, x
)
= D′(m)m−D(m) . (23)
Diﬀerentiate this equation to obtain
dm
dH
= C11
C11
H
m
+D′′2
> 0 , (24)
dm
dL =
C12m
C11
H
m
+D′′2
= C12mC11
dm
dH ≤ 0 , (25)
dm
dx
= C13m
C11
H
m
+D′′2
= C13mC11
dm
dH
≥ 0 . (26)
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Therefore, we can express the derivatives of cost function C as
C1 = D′(m) > 0 ,
C2 = C2 ,
C11 = D′′(m)dmdH > 0 , (27)
C12 = D′′(m)dmdL ≤ 0 , (28)
C22 = C22 − C12 H
m2
dm
dL
, (29)
C13 = D′′(m)dmdx ≥ 0 , (30)
C23 = C23 − C12 H
m2
dm
dx
. (31)
Lemma A.1: Suppose that J is twice diﬀerentiable and concave in L. Then T (J) is
twice diﬀerentiable and
(a) concave in L if the following condition holds:
C212 + C11[xF ′′ − C22] ≤ 0 . (32)
(b) concave in L and supermodular in (L, x) if J is supermodular in (L, x) and if (32)
and the following condition hold:
C12C13 + C11[F ′ − C23] ≥ 0 . (33)
Lemma A.2:
(a) Condition (32) holds under the following condition on the original cost function
C:
C212 + C11[xF
′′ − C22] ≤ 0 . (34)
(b) Condition (33) holds under the following condition on the original cost function
C:
C12C13 + C11[F
′ − C23] ≥ 0 . (35)
Proof of Lemma A.1:
Consider T (J) deﬁned by the RHS of (21).
Part (a). Since J is a concave and twice diﬀerentiable function of L, T (J) is also twice
diﬀerentiable, and a policy function exists and is diﬀerentiable. Diﬀerentiate T (J) twice
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with respect to L to obtain
d2(T (J))
dL2
= xF ′′ − C22 + βϕ(1 − s)J11 +
[
− C12 + βϕJ11
]
dH
dL
. (36)
Diﬀerentiate the FOC C1 = β(1− δ)J1 with respect to L to obtain
dH
dL
=
βϕJ11 − C12
C11 − β(1− δ)J11 . (37)
Substitute this into (36) to obtain
d2(T (J))
dL2
= xF ′′ − C22 + βϕ(1 − s)J11C11 + C
2
12 − 2βϕJ11C12
C11 − β(1 − δ)J11 .
In the last term, the denominator is positive and larger than C11. In the numerator, all
terms involving J11 are negative (due to (27) and (28)); hence the numerator is smaller
than C212. Therefore,
d2(T (J))
dL2
≤ xF ′′ − C22 + C
2
12C11 ,
which is non-positive under (32). Hence, T maps a concave and twice diﬀerentiable
function into a function with the same properties.
Part (b). Since J is a concave, supermodular and twice diﬀerentiable function of (L, x),
T (J) is twice diﬀerentiable and a diﬀerentiable policy function exists. Diﬀerentiate
T (J) twice with respect to L and x to obtain
d2(T (J))
dLdx
= F ′ − C23 + βϕJ12 +
[
− C12 + βϕJ11
]
dH
dx
. (38)
Diﬀerentiate the FOC C1 = β(1− δ)J1 with respect to x to obtain
dH
dx
=
β(1− δ)J12 − C13
C11 − β(1− δ)J11 . (39)
Substitute this into (38) to obtain
d2(T (J))
dLdx
= F ′ − C23 + βϕJ12C11 + C12C13 − β(1− δ)J12C12 − βϕJ11C13C11 − β(1− δ)J11 .
In the last term, the denominator is positive and larger than C11. In the numerator, all
terms involving J11 and J12 are non-negative (due to (27), (28) and (30)); hence the
numerator is greater than C12C13 ≤ 0. Therefore,
d2(T (J))
dLdx ≥ F
′ − C23 + C12C13C11 ,
which is non-negative under (33). Hence, T (J) is supermodular. 
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Proof of Lemma A.2:
From (25), (26), (27), (28) and (30) follows that
C12 = C11C12mC11 , (40)
C13 = C11C13mC11 . (41)
Furthermore, substituting (28) into (25), and substituting (30) into (26) to eliminate
D′′(m) imply that
C22 = C22 − C
2
12
C11
+ mC12C11
C12 , (42)
C23 = C23 − C12C11
[
C13 −mC13
]
. (43)
Part (a): Rewrite (32) using (40) and (42) to obtain the equivalent condition
xF ′′ − C22 + C
2
12
C11
≤ 0 .
Because of C11 > 0, this condition is equivalent to (34).
Part (b): Rewrite (33) using (40), (41) and (43) to obtain the equivalent condition
F ′ − C23 + C12C13C11 ≥ 0 .
Because of C11 > 0, this condition is equivalent to (35). 
Proof of Proposition 1 (continued):
It follows from Lemma A.1 and A.2 that the value function J(L, x) is concave in L
and supermodular in (L, x) because property (C) together with the assumption that
xF (.)− C(.) is concave in (L, V ) guarantee both (34) and (35).
Because of strict concavity of problem (20), policy functions mx(L) and V x(mx(L), L)
exist. To derive ﬁrst-order conditions (5) and (6) is straightforward: The ﬁrst condition
directly follows from (23); the second follows from the intertemporal optimality condi-
tion C1(H,L, x) = β(1 − δ)J1(L(1 − s) + H,x) and from using the envelope theorem
and (5).
The properties of V x stated in Proposition 1 were already established in the main text.
To see how mx(L) depends on L, use (25) and (37) to get
dmx(L)
dL
=
dm(H,L, x)
dL
+
dm(H,L, x)
dH
dH
dL
= dm
dH
[
C12m
C11
+
βϕJ11 − C12
C11 − β(1 − δ)J11
]
.
Because of
C12m
C11
= C12C11 ≤
C12C11 − β(1 − δ)J11 ,
the term in [.] is negative, and so is dmx/(dL).
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To verify that m is increasing in x, use (26) and (39) to get
dmx(L)
dx
=
dm(H,L, x)
dx
+
dm(H,L, x)
dH
dH
dx
= dm
dH
[
C13m
C11
+
β(1− δ)J12 − C13
C11 − β(1 − δ)J11
]
.
Because of
C13m
C11
= C13C11 ≥
C13
C11 − β(1 − δ)J11 ,
the term in [.] is positive, and so is dmx/(dx). 
Corollary 2: If recruitment costs are given by either speciﬁcation in (1) with parameter
h suﬃciently small, more productive ﬁrms have a higher growth rate, conditional on
size; and larger/older ﬁrms have a lower growth rate, conditional on productivity.
Proof of Corollary 2:
Because of exogenous separations, the growth rate of a ﬁrm, [mV − sL]/L is perfectly
correlated with the job-creation rate,
JCR(x,L) = mx(L)
V x(mx(L), L)
L .
Diﬀerentiation of the job-creation rate with respect to x implies
dJCR
dx =
dmx
dx
V x
L +
mx
L
dV x
dx +
mx
L
dV x
dm
dmx
dx .
In this expression, the ﬁrst and the third term are strictly positive. Under the second
cost function in (1), the second term is zero. Under the ﬁrst cost function in (1), the
second term is zero when h = 0, and negative but small if h is small. Thus, dJCR/(dx)
is positive if h is suﬃciently small.
Diﬀerentiation of the job-creation rate with respect to L implies
dJCR
dL =
dmx
dL
V x
L +
mx
L
dV x
dL +
mx
L
dV x
dm
dmx
dL −m
V x
L2
.
In this expression, the ﬁrst, the third and the fourth term are strictly negative. Under
the second cost function in (1), dV
x
dL
= V
x
L , and the second and forth terms cancel out.
Under the ﬁrst cost function in (1), the second term is zero when h = 0, and positive
but small if h is small. Thus, dJCR/(dL) is negative if h is suﬃciently small. 
Lemma A.3: In the stationary model with recruitment cost C(V,L, x) = xF (L) −
xF (L − hV ) + cV , job-ﬁlling rates in the optimal ﬁrm’s problem follow the dynamic
equation
ρ
[
mt+1λ
′(mt+1)− λ(mt+1)
]
− (b+ ρ)h− c = ρh
β(1− δ)
[
λ′(mt)− βϕλ′(mt+1)
]
. (44)
It has a unique steady state solution m∗ > 0 if, and only if,
h <
β(1− δ)m
1− βϕ , (45)
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with m ≡ limm→1m− λ(m)λ′(m) > 0. Under this condition, any sequence mt > 0 satisfying
this dynamic equation converges to m∗.
Proof of Lemma A.3:
It is straightforward to derive (44) by substitution of (5) into (6). A steady state m∗
must satisfy the condition
ρ
[
m− λ(m)
λ′(m)
]
=
ρh(1 − βϕ)
β(1− δ) +
(b+ ρ)h+ c
λ′(m) . (46)
The LHS is strictly increasing and goes from 0 to ρm as m goes from 0 to 1. The RHS
is decreasing in m with limit ρh(1− βϕ)/[β(1− δ)] for m → 1. Hence, a unique steady
state m∗ exists iﬀ (45) holds.40 Furthermore, diﬀerentiation of (44) at m∗ implies that
dmt+1
dmt
∣∣∣
m∗
= h
β(1− δ)m∗ + hβϕ ,
which is positive and smaller than one iﬀ
h <
β(1− δ)m∗
1− βϕ .
But this inequality must be true because (46) implies
h =
ρ[m∗λ′(m∗)− λ(m∗)]− c
ρ[1−βϕ]
β(1−δ) λ
′(m∗)+b+ρ
<
β(1 − δ)m∗
1− βϕ .
Therefore, the steady statem∗ is locally stable. Moreover, the dynamic equation deﬁnes
a continuous, increasing relation between mt+1 and mt which has only one intersection
with the 45-degree line. Hence, mt+1 > mt for any mt < m
∗ and mt+1 < mt for any
mt > m
∗, which implies that mt converges to m∗ from any initial value m0 > 0. 
Proposition 2: A stationary competitive search equilibrium exists and is unique.
There is strictly positive ﬁrm entry provided that K is suﬃciently small.
Proof of Proposition 2:
It remains to prove existence and uniqueness. From Proposition 1 follows that the
entrant’s value function Jx(0, 0) is decreasing and continuous in ρ. Hence the expected
proﬁt prior to entry,
Π∗(ρ) ≡
∑
x∈X
π(x)Jx(0, 0)
is a decreasing and continuous function of ρ. Moreover, the function is strictly de-
creasing in ρ whenever it is positive. This also follows from the proof of Proposition
1 which shows that J(0, x; ρ) is strictly decreasing in ρ when the new ﬁrm x recruits
workers (V x(mx(0), 0) > 0). If no new ﬁrm recruits workers, expected proﬁt of an
40If this condition fails, ﬁrms cannot proﬁtably recruit workers.
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entrant cannot be positive. Hence, equation (7) can have at most one solution for any
K > 0. This implies uniqueness, with entry of ﬁrms if (7) can be fulﬁlled or without
entry of ﬁrms otherwise. A solution to (7) exists provided that K is suﬃciently small.
To see this, Π∗(0) is strictly positive because of F ′(0) = ∞: some entrants will recruit
workers since the marginal product J1(mV, x; ρ) is suﬃciently large relative to the cost
of recruitment and relative to the wage cost which are, for ρ = 0, equal to mV b (see
equation (20)). But when Π∗(0) > 0, a suﬃciently small value of K guarantees that
(7) has a solution since limρ→∞Π∗(ρ) = 0. 
Proposition 3: The stationary competitive search equilibrium is socially optimal.
Proof of Proposition 3:
The social planner decides at each point in time about ﬁrm entry, vacancy postings
and job-ﬁlling rates for all ﬁrms. The planner takes as given the numbers of ﬁrms
that entered in some earlier period, as well as the employment stocks of all these
ﬁrms. Formally, the planner’s state vector is σ = (Na, L
x
a)a≥1,x∈X where Na is the
mass of ﬁrms of age a ≥ 1, and Lxa is employment of a ﬁrm with productivity x and
age a. The planner maximizes the present value of output net of opportunity costs of
employment and net of the costs of entry and recruitment, subject to the economy’s
resource constraint. With σ+ = (Na,+, L
x
a,+)a≥1,x∈X denoting the state vector in the
next period, the recursive formulation of the social planning problem is
S(σ) = max
N0,(V xa ,m
x
a)a≥0
{∑
a≥0
Na
∑
x∈X
π(x)
[
xF (Lxa)− bLxa − C(V xa , Lxa, x)
]}
−KN0 + βS(σ+) (47)
s.t. Lx0 = 0, L
x
a+1,+ = (1− s)Lxa +mxaV xa , a ≥ 0, x ∈ X ,
Na+1,+ = (1− δ)Na , a ≥ 0 ,∑
a≥0
Na
∑
x∈X
π(x)
(
Lxa + λ(m
x
a)V
x
a
)
≤ 1 .
We now show that the ﬁrst-order conditions that uniquely characterize the decentralized
allocation are also ﬁrst order conditions to the planner’s problem. The same argument
that we use in the proof of Lemma A.4 part (b) (see the proof of Proposition 4) then
establishes that the planner cannot improve upon this allocation. We denote by SN,a
the derivative of S with respect to Na and by SL,a,x the derivative of S with respect
to Lxa. The multiplier on the resource constraint is μ ≥ 0. First-order conditions with
respect to N0, V
x
a , and m
x
a, a ≥ 0, are∑
x∈X
π(x)
[
xF (0) − C(V x0 , 0, x)
]
−K + β(1− δ)SN,1 − μ
∑
x∈X
π(x)λ(mx0)V
x
0 = 0 , (48)
−Naπ(x)
[
C1(V
x
a , L
x
a, x) + μλ(m
x
a)
]
+ βSL,a+1,xm
x
a ≤ 0 , V xa ≥ 0 , (49)
βSL,a+1,x − μNaπ(x)λ′(mxa) = 0 . (50)
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Here condition (49) holds with complementary slackness. The envelope conditions are,
for a ≥ 1 and x ∈ X,
SL,a,x = Naπ(x)
[
xF ′(Lxa)−C ′2(V xa , Lxa, x)− b− μ
]
+ β(1− s)SL,a+1,x , (51)
SN,a =
∑
x∈X
π(x)
[
xF (Lxa)−C(V xa , Lxa, x)−bLxa
]
−μ
∑
x∈X
π(x)
(
Lxa+λ(m
x
a)V
x
a
)
+β(1−δ)SN,a+1 .
(52)
Use (50) to substitute SL,a,x into (51) to obtain
xF ′(Lxa+1)− C2(V xa+1, Lxa+1, x)− b− μ = μβ(1− δ) [λ
′(mxa)− βϕλ′(mxa+1)] .
This equation is the planner’s intertemporal optimality condition; it coincides with
equation (6) for μ = ρ. This is intuitive: when the social value of an unemployed
worker μ coincides with the surplus value that an unemployed worker obtains in search
equilibrium, the ﬁrm’s recruitment policy is eﬃcient. Next substitute (50) into (49) to
obtain, for a ≥ 0 and x ∈ X,
C1(V
x
a , L
x
a, x) ≥ μ[mxaλ′(mxa)− λ(mxa)] , V xa ≥ 0 . (53)
Again for μ = ρ, this condition coincides with the ﬁrm’s intratemporal optimality
condition in competitive search equilibrium, equation (5). Lastly, it remains to verify
that entry is socially eﬃcient when the value of a jobless worker is μ = ρ. The plan-
ner’s choice of ﬁrm entry, condition (48), together with the recursive equation for the
marginal ﬁrm surplus SN,a, equation (52), shows that
K =
∑
a≥0
[β(1− δ)]a
∑
x∈X
π(x)
[
xF (Lxa)− bLxa−C(V xa , Lxa, x)−μ(Lxa+λ(mxa)V xa )
]
. (54)
On the other hand, the expected proﬁt value of a new ﬁrm is∑
x∈X
π(x)Jx(0, 0) =
∑
a≥0
[β(1 − δ)]a
∑
x∈X
π(x)
[
xF (Lxa)−W xa − C(V xa , Lxa, x)
]
.
Hence, the free-entry condition in search equilibrium, equation (7), coincides with con-
dition (54) for μ = ρ if, for all x ∈ X,∑
a≥0
[β(1 − δ)]a
[
(b+ μ)Lxa + μλ(m
x
a)V
x
a −W xa
]
= 0 . (55)
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Now after substitution of
Lxa =
a−1∑
k=0
(1− s)a−1−kmxkV xk , and
W xa =
a−1∑
k=0
(1− s)a−1−kV xk
[
ρλ(mxk)(1− βϕ)
β(1 − δ) +m
x
k(b+ ρ)
]
into (55), it is straightforward to see that the equation is satisﬁed for μ = ρ. 
Proposition 4:
(a) Suppose that a solution of (14) and (15) exists with associated allocation A =
(N,L,V,m, s, δ) satisfying N(zt) > 0 for all zt. Then A is a solution of the
sequential planning problem (12).
(b) If K(z), f , and b are suﬃciently small and if z1 = . . . = zn = z, equations
(14) and (15) have a unique solution (G,M). Moreover, if the transition matrix
ψ(zj |zi) is strictly diagonally dominant and if |zi − z| is suﬃciently small for all
i, equations (14) and (15) have a unique solution.
Proof of Proposition 4:
Part (a):
Let βtψ(zt)μ(zt) ≥ 0 be the multiplier on the resource constraint (13) in history node
zt. That is, μ(zt) is the social value of a worker in history zt. Write μ = (μ(zt)) for the
vector of multipliers. Let Gt(L, x, z
t) denote the social value of an existing ﬁrm with
employment stock L, idiosyncratic productivity x and aggregate productivity history
zt. The sequence Gt obeys the recursive equations
Gt(L, x, z
t) = max
δ,s,V,m
xztF (L)− bL− μ(zt)[L+ λ(m)V ]− C(V,L, xzt)− f (56)
+β(1− δ)Ex,ztGt+1(L+, x+, zt+1)
s.t. L+ = (1− s)L+mV ,
δ ∈ [δ0, 1], s ∈ [s0, 1], m ∈ [0, 1], V ≥ 0 .
We ﬁrst prove the equivalence between problem (56) and the planner’s problem (12)
(Lemma A.4). Then we show that the reduced problem (14) solves (56) if entry is
positive in all states.
Lemma A.4:
(a) For given multipliers μ(zt), there exist value functions Gt : IR+×X ×Zt+1 → IR,
t ≥ 0, satisfying the system of recursive equations (56).
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(b) If X = (N,L,V,m, s, δ) is a solution of the planning problem (12) with multipliers
μ = (μ(zt)), then the corresponding ﬁrm policies also solve problem (56) and the
complementary-slackness condition∑
x∈X
π0(x)Gt(0, x, z
t) ≤ K(zt) , N0(zt) ≥ 0 , (57)
is satisﬁed for all zt. Conversely, if X solves for every ﬁrm problem (56) with
multipliers μ, and if condition (57) and the resource constraint (13) hold for all
zt, then X is a solution of the planning problem (12).
Proof of Lemma A.4:
Part (a): The RHS in the system of equations in (56) deﬁnes an operator T which maps
a sequence of bounded functions G = (Gt)t≥0, with Gt : [0, L] × X × Zt → IR such
that ‖G‖ ≡ supt ‖Gt‖ < ∞, into another sequence of bounded functions G˜ = (G˜t)t≥0
with ‖G˜‖ = supt ‖G˜t‖ < ∞. Here L is suﬃciently large such that the bound L+ ≤ L
does not bind for any L ∈ [0, L]. The existence of L follows from the Inada condition
for F : the marginal product of an additional worker xzF ′(L+) − b must be negative
for any x ∈ X, z ∈ Z, for all L+ ≥ L with suﬃciently large L; hence no hiring will
occur beyond L. Because the operator satisﬁes Blackwell’s suﬃcient conditions, it is a
contraction in the space of bounded function sequences G. Hence, the operator T has
a unique ﬁxed point which is a sequence of bounded functions.
Part (b): Take ﬁrst a solution X of the planning problem, and write βtψ(zt)μ(zt) ≥ 0
for the multipliers on constraints (13). Then X maximizes the Lagrange function
L = max
∑
t≥0,zt
βtψ(zt)
{
−K(zt)N0(zt) +
∑
a≥0,xa
N(xa, zt)
[
xaztF (L(x
a, zt))− bL(xa, zt)
−f − C(V (xa, zt), L(xa, zt), xazt)− μ(zt)
[
L(xa, zt) + λ(m(xa, zt))V (xa, zt)
]]}
For each individual ﬁrm, this problem is the sequential formulation of the recursive
problem (56) with multipliers μ(zt). Hence, ﬁrm policies also solve the recursive prob-
lem; furthermore, the maximum of the Lagrange function is the same as the sum of
the social values of entrant ﬁrms plus the social values of ﬁrms which already exist at
t = 0, namely,
L = max
N0(.)
∑
t,zt
βtψ(zt)N0(z
t)
[
−K(zt) +
∑
x
π0(x)Gt(0, x, z
t)
]
+
∑
z∈Z
ψ(z0)
∑
a≥1,xa
N(xa, z0)G0(L(x
a, z0), xa, z
0) .
This also proves that the complementary-slackness condition (57) describes optimal
entry.
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To prove the converse, suppose that X solves for every ﬁrm the recursive problem
(56) with given multipliers μ(zt), and that (57) and the resource constraints (13) are
satisﬁed. We prove that X also solves the original planning problem (12) subject to
(13) by contradiction: Suppose that there is an allocation X′ is feasible for problem
(12) under constraint (13) and strictly dominates X. Write
O(xa, zt) ≡ xaztF (L(xa, zt))− bL(xa, zt)− f − C(V (xa, zt), L(xa, zt), xazt)
for the net output created by ﬁrm (xa, zt) in allocation X and write O′(xa, zt) for the
same object in allocation X′. Further, write S for the total surplus value in allocation
X and write S′ > S for the surplus value in allocation X′. Then
S′ =
∑
t≥0,zt
βtψ(zt)
{
−K(zt)N ′0(zt) +
∑
a≥0,xa
N ′(xa, zt)O′(xa, zt)
}
=
∑
t≥0,zt
βtψ(zt)
{
−K(zt)N ′0(zt) + μ(zt)− μ(zt) +
∑
a≥0,xa
N ′(xa, zt)O′(xa, zt)
}
≤
∑
t≥0,zt
βtψ(zt)
{
−K(zt)N ′0(zt) + μ(zt)
+
∑
a≥0,xa
N ′(xa, zt)
[
O′(xa, zt)− μ(zt)
(
L′(xa, zt) + λ(m′(xa, zt))V ′(xa, zt)
)]}
≤
∑
t≥0,zt
βtψ(zt)N ′0(z
t)
[
−K(zt) +
∑
x
π0(x)Gt(0, x, z
t)
]
+
∑
z∈Z
ψ(z0)
∑
a≥1,xa
N(xa, z0)G0(L(x
a, z0), xa, z
0) +
∑
t,zt
βtψ(zt)μ(zt)
≤
∑
t≥0,zt
βtψ(zt)N0(z
t)
[
−K(zt) +
∑
x
π0(x)Gt(0, x, z
t)
]
+
∑
z∈Z
ψ(z0)
∑
a≥1,xa
N(xa, z0)G0(L(x
a, z0), xa, z
0) +
∑
t,zt
βtψ(zt)μ(zt) = S .
Here the ﬁrst equality just adds and subtracts μ(zt). The subsquent inequality follows
from resource constraint (13). The second inequality follows since the discounted sum
of surplus values for an individual ﬁrm which is of age a at time t, namely
∑
τ≥t
βτ−t
∑
xa+τ−tzτ
ψ(zτ |zt)π(xa+τ−t|xa)
τ−1∏
k=t
[1− δ(xa+k−t, zk)]
[
O′(xa+τ−t, zτ )− μ(zτ )[L′(xa+τ−t, zτ ) + λ(m′(xa+τ−t, zτ ))V ′(xa+τ−t, zτ )]
]
,
is bounded above Gt(0, x0, zt) (for new ﬁrms, a = 0) or by G0(L(x
a, z0), xa, z
0) (for
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ﬁrms of age a > 0 existing at t = 0) by deﬁnition of Gt. The third inequality
follows from the complementary-slackness condition (57): either the term −K(zt) +∑
x π0(x)Gt(0, x, z
t) is zero in which case the ﬁrst summand is zero on both sides of
the inequality; or it is strictly negative in which case N0(z
t) = 0 and N ′0(z
t) ≥ 0. The
last equality follows from the deﬁnition of surplus value S and the assumption that al-
location X solves problem (56) at the level of each individual ﬁrm. This proves S′ ≤ S
and hence contradicts the hypothesis S′ > S. This completes the proof of Lemma A.4.

Proof of Proposition 4 (continued):
To complete the proof of Prop. 3, part (a), let μi be the multiplier in aggregate state zi,
deﬁned by (14) and (15), and write M = (μ1, . . . , μn). With μ(z
t) ≡ μi for zt = zi, the
unique solution of (56) coincides with the one of (14), i.e. Gt(L, x, z
t) = G(L, x, i;M)
for zt = zi, and also the ﬁrm-level policies coincide. If they give rise to an allocation
X with positive entry in all aggregate states zt, (15) implies that (57) holds for all zt.
Hence Lemma A.4(b) implies that X is a solution of the planning problem.
Part (b): Solving (14) in the stationary case z = z involves to ﬁnd a single value
function G(L, x;M). Application of the contraction mapping theorem implies that
such a solution exists, is unique, and is continuous and non-increasing in μ ∈ IR and
strictly decreasing in μ when G(.) > 0.
Therefore, the function Γ(μ) ≡ ∑x π0(x)G(0, x;μ) ≥ 0 is continuous, strictly decreas-
ing when positive, and zero for large enough μ. Furthermore, when f and b are suﬃ-
ciently small, Γ(0) > 0; hence when K > 0 is suﬃciently small, there exists a unique
μ ≥ 0 satisfying equation (15).
In the stochastic case z ∈ {z1, . . . , zn} and for any given vector M = (μ1, . . . , μn) ∈ Rn+,
the system of recursive equations (14) has a unique solution G(.;M). Again this follows
from the application of the contraction-mapping theorem. Furthermore, G is diﬀeren-
tiable in M , and all elements of the Jacobian (dG(L, x, i;M)/(dμj ))i,j are non-positive.
The RHS of (14) deﬁnes an operator mapping a function G(L, x, i;M) with a strictly
diagonally dominant Jacobian matrix (dG(L, x, i;M)/(dμj ))i,j into another function
G˜ whose Jacobian matrix (dG˜(L, x, i;M)/(dμj ))i,j is diagonally dominant. This fol-
lows since the transition matrix ψ(zj |zi) is strictly diagonally dominant and since all
elements of (dG˜(L, x, i;M)/(dμj )) have the same (non-positive) sign. Therefore, the
unique ﬁxed point has a strictly diagonally dominant Jacobian. Now suppose that
(z1, . . . , zn) is close to (z, . . . , z) and consider the solution μ1 = . . . = μn = μ of the
stationary problem. Since the Jacobian matrix (dG(0, x, i;M)/(dμj ))i,j is strictly di-
agonally dominant, it is invertible. By the implicit function theorem, a unique solution
M to equation (15) exits. 
For the proof of Proposition 5, see Appendix B.
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Appendix B: Decentralization
The Workers’ Search Problem
Let U(zt) be the utility value of an unemployed worker in history zt, and let E(Ca, xk, zt)
be the utility value of a worker hired by a ﬁrm of age a in contract Ca who is currently
employed at that ﬁrm in history xk, with k > a. The latter satisﬁes the recursive
equation
E(Ca, xk, zt) = wa(xk, zt) + β
{
(1− ϕa(xk, zt))EztU(zt+1) (58)
+ϕa(x
k, zt)Exk,ztE(Ca, xk+1, zt+1)
}
.
An unemployed worker searches for contracts which promise the highest expected util-
ity, considering that more attractive contracts are less likely to sign. The worker ob-
serves all contracts Ca and he knows that the probability to sign a contract is m/λ(m)
when m is the ﬁrm’s matching probability at the oﬀered contract. That is, potential
contracts are parameterized by the tuple (m, Ca). Unemployed workers apply for those
contracts where expected surplus is maximized:
ρ(zt) = max
(m,Ca)
m
λ(m)
(1− δ(xa, zt))βExa,zt
[
E(Ca, xa+1, zt+1)− U(zt+1)
]
. (59)
The Bellman equation for an unemployed worker reads as
U(zt) = b+ ρ(zt) + βEztU(z
t+1) . (60)
The Firms’ Problem
A ﬁrm of age a in history (xa, zt) takes as given the employment stocks of workers hired
in some earlier period, (Lτ )
a−1
τ=0, as well as the contracts signed with these workers,
(Cτ )a−1τ=0. For the contracts to be consistent with the ﬁrm’s constraints on exit and
separations, the retention probabilities must satisfy ϕτ (x
a, zt) ≤ (1− s0)(1 − δ0). The
ﬁrm chooses an actual exit probability δ ≥ δ0 and cohort-speciﬁc layoﬀ probabilities
sτ . For these probabilities to be consistent with separation probabilities speciﬁed in
existing contracts, it must hold that δ ≤ 1 − ϕτ (xa, zt) for all τ ≤ a − 1, and sτ =
1 − ϕτ (xa, zt)/(1 − δ) when δ < 1, with arbitrary choice of sτ when δ = 1. The
ﬁrm also decides new contracts Ca to be posted in V vacancies with desired matching
probability m. It is no restriction to presuppose that the ﬁrm oﬀers only one type of
contract. When Ja is the value function of a ﬁrm of age a, the ﬁrm’s problem is written
as
Ja
[
(Cτ )a−1τ=0, (Lτ )a−1τ=0, xa, zt
]
= max
(δ,m,V,Ca)
xaztF (L)−W − C(V,L, xazt) (61)
−f + β(1− δ)Exa,ztJa+1
[
(Cτ )aτ=0, (Lτ+)aτ=0, xa+1, zt+1
]
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s.t. La+ = mV, m ∈ [0, 1], V ≥ 0, Lτ+ = Lτ ϕτ (x
a, zt)
1− δ , τ ≤ a− 1 , (62)
δ ∈ [δ0, min
0≤τ≤a−1
1− ϕτ (xa, zt)], s0 ≤ 1− ϕτ (xa, zt)/(1 − δ) , (63)
W =
a−1∑
τ=0
wτ (x
a, zt)Lτ , L =
a−1∑
τ=0
Lτ , (64)
ρ(zt) = m
λ(m)
(1− δ)βExa,zt
[
E(Ca, xa+1, zt+1)− U(zt+1)
]
if m > 0 . (65)
The last condition is the workers’ participation constraint; it speciﬁes the minimum
expected utility that contract Ca must promise in order to attract a worker queue of
length λ(m) per vacancy.
Definition: A competitive search equilibrium is a list[
U(zt), E(.), ρ(zt), Ca(xa, zt),m(xa, zt), V (xa, zt), δ(xa, zt), Ja(.), Lτ (xa, zt), N(xa, zt), N0(zt)
]
,
for all t ≥ 0, a ≥ 0, xa ∈ Xa+1, zt ∈ Zt+1, 0 ≤ τ ≤ a, and for a given initial ﬁrm
distribution, such that
(a) Firms’ exit, hiring and layoﬀ strategies are optimal. That is, Ja is the value
function and Ca(.), δ(.), m(.), and V (.) are the policy functions for problem
(61)-(65).
(b) Employment evolves according to
Lτ (x
a, zt) = Lτ (x
a−1, zt−1) ϕτ (x
a, zt)
1− δ(xa, zt) , 0 ≤ τ ≤ a− 1 ,
La(x
a, zt) = m(xa, zt)V (xa, zt) , a ≥ 0 .
(c) Firm entry is optimal. That is, the complementary slackness condition∑
x
π0(x)J0(x, z
t) ≤ K(zt) , N0(zt) ≥ 0 , (66)
holds for all zt, and the number of ﬁrms evolves according to (9) and (11).
(d) Workers’ search strategies are optimal, i.e. (ρ, U,E) satisfy equations (58), (59)
and (60).
(e) Aggregate resource feasibility; for all zt,
∑
a≥0,xa
N(xa, zt)
[
λ(m(xa, zt))V (xa, zt) +
a−1∑
τ=0
Lτ (x
a, zt)
]
= 1 . (67)
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Proposition 5: A competitive search equilibrium is socially optimal.
Proof of Proposition 5:
The proof proceeds in two steps. First, substitute the participation constraint (65)
into the ﬁrm’s problem and make use of the contracts’ recursive equations (58) to show
that the ﬁrms’ recursive proﬁt maximization problem is identical to the maximization
of the social surplus of a ﬁrm. Second, show that a competitive search equilibrium is
socially optimal.
First, deﬁne the social surplus of a ﬁrm with history (xa, zt) and with predetermined
contracts and employment levels as follows:
Ga
[
(Cτ )a−1τ=0, (Lτ )a−1τ=0, xa, zt
]
≡ Ja
[
(Cτ )a−1τ=0, (Lτ )a−1τ=0, xa, zt
]
+
a−1∑
τ=0
Lτ
[
E(Cτ , xa, zt)−U(zt)
]
.
(68)
Using (58) and (60), the worker surplus satisﬁes
E(Cτ , xa, zt)−U(zt) = wτ (xa, zt)−b−ρ(zt)+βϕτ (xa, zt)Exa,zt
[
E(Cτ , xa+1, zt+1)−U(zt+1)
]
.
Now substitute this equation and (61) into (68), and write
σ ≡
[
(Cτ )a−1τ=0, (Lτ )a−1τ=0, xa, zt
]
and σ+ ≡
[
(Cτ )aτ=0, (Lτ+)aτ=0, xa+1, zt+1
]
,
with Lτ+ as deﬁned in (62) and L =
∑a−1
τ=0 Lτ , to obtain
Ga(σ) = max
δ,m,V,Ca
{
xaztF (L)− C(V,L, xazt)− f −
a−1∑
τ=0
Lτwτ (x
a, zt) (69)
+β(1− δ)Exa,ztJa+1(σ+)
}
+
a−1∑
τ=0
Lτ
[
wτ (x
a, zt)− b− ρ(zt)
+βϕτ (x
a, zt)Exa,zt
[
E(Cτ , xa+1, zt+1)− U(zt+1)
]]
= max
δ,m,V,Ca
{
xaztF (L)− [b+ ρ(zt)]L− f − C(V,L, xazt) + β(1− δ)Exa,ztJa+1(σ+)
+β
a−1∑
τ=0
Lτϕτ (x
a, zt)Exa,zt
[
E(Cτ , xa+1, zt+1)− U(zt+1)
]}
= max
δ,m,V,Ca
{
xaztF (L)− bL− ρ(zt)[L+ λ(m)V ]− f − C(V,L, xazt)
+β(1− δ)Exa,ztJa+1(σ+)
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+β(1− δ)
a∑
τ=0
Lτ+Exa,zt
[
E(Cτ , xa+1, zt+1)− U(zt+1)
]}
= max
δ,m,V,Ca
{
xaztF (L)− bL− ρ(zt)[L+ λ(m)V ]− f
−C(V,L, xazt) + β(1− δ)Exa,ztGa+1(σ+)
}
.
Here maximization is always subject to (62) and (63), the third equation makes use of
(1− δ)Lτ+ = ϕτ (xa, zt)Lτ ,
for τ ≤ a− 1, and
ρ(zt)λ(m)V = β(1− δ)La+Exa,zt
[
E(Ca, xa+1, zt+1)− U(zt+1)
]
,
and the last equation makes use of (68) for Ga+1. This shows that the ﬁrm solves a sur-
plus maximization problem which is identical to the one of the planner speciﬁed in (56)
provided that ρ(zt) = μ(zt) holds for all zt, where μ is the social value of an unemployed
worker as deﬁned in the proof of Proposition 4. The only diﬀerence between the two
problems is that the ﬁrm commits to cohort-speciﬁc separation probabilities, whereas
the planner chooses in every period an identical separation probability for all workers
(and he clearly has no reason to do otherwise). Nonetheless, both problems have the
same solution: they are dynamic optimization problems of a single decision maker in
which payoﬀ functions are the same and the decision sets are the same. Further, time
inconsistency is not an issue since there is no strategic interaction and since discounting
is exponential. Hence solutions to the two problems, with respect to ﬁrm exit, layoﬀs
and hiring strategies, are identical. In both problems the decision maker could discrim-
inate between diﬀerent cohorts in principal. Because such diﬀerential treatment does
not raise social ﬁrm value, there is also no reason for competitive search to produce
such an outcome. Nonetheless, there can be equilibrium allocations where diﬀerent co-
horts have diﬀerent separation probabilities, but these equilibria must also be socially
optimal because they maximize social ﬁrm value.
It remains to verify that competitive search gives indeed rise to socially eﬃcient ﬁrm
entry. When μ(zt) = ρ(zt), G0(x, z
t) = J0(x, z
t) as deﬁned in (68) coincides with
G0(0, x, z
t), as deﬁned in (56). Hence, the free-entry condition (66) coincides with the
condition for socially optimal ﬁrm entry (57). Because of aggregate resource feasibility
(67), the planner’s resource constraint (13) is also satisﬁed. Since the allocation of
a competitive search equilibrium satisﬁes all the requirements of Lemma A.4(b), it is
socially optimal. 
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Appendix C: Calibration and Computation
Calibration
We choose the period length to be one week and set β = 0.999 so that the annual interest
rate is about 5 percent. We assume a CES matching function m(λ) = (1 + kλ−r)−1/r
(i.e. the inverse of the function λ(m) used in the main text) and set the two parameters
k and r to target a weekly job-ﬁnding rate of 0.129 and an elasticity of the job-ﬁnding
rate with respect to the vacancy-unemployment ratio of 0.28 (Shimer (2005)).41 By
choosing parameter c of the recruitment technology (see below), we also target the
(average) weekly job-ﬁlling rate at 0.3, which corresponds to a monthly vacancy yield
of 1.3 (Davis et al. (2013)). Since in steady state the unemployment-vacancy ratio
equals the ratio between the job-ﬁlling rate and the job-ﬁnding rate, we calculate the
parameters k and r to attain the two targets at λ = 0.3/0.129 = 2.326.
The production technology is Cobb-Douglas with xLα where the ﬁrm’s idiosyncratic
productivity x = x0x1 contains a time-invariant component x0 and a transitory compo-
nent x1 (cf. Elsby and Michaels (2013)). The time-invariant component is drawn upon
ﬁrm entry from one of ﬁve values xi0, i = 1, . . . , 5, with entry shares σ
i where (xi0, σ
i)
are chosen to match the ﬁrm and employment shares within the ﬁve size classes 1-49,
50-249, 250-999, 1000-9999, and ≥ 10000, where data targets are taken from the Busi-
ness Dynamics Statistics (BDS) of the U.S. Census Bureau. The transitory component
x1 is drawn from one of ﬁve equidistant values in the range [1−x, 1+x] and is redrawn
every period with probability π. Parameters π and x are chosen to match a monthly
separation rate of 4.2 percent and the observation that about two thirds of employment
is at ﬁrms with monthly employment growth rates in the range [−0.02, 0.02] (see Davis
et al. (2010)). Firm exit is exogenous; that is, we set the operating cost to f = 0 and
choose exit probabilities speciﬁc for the ﬁve size classes δi, i = 1, . . . , 5, to match annual
ﬁrm exit rates from the BDS. Parameter α is set to 0.7 which gives rise to a labor share
of roughly 2/3. Given that all capital is ﬁxed at the level of a ﬁrm, this consideration
does not take into account variable capital investment at the ﬁrm level which would
suggest a higher value of α; see Appendix D for a robustness analysis regarding this
parameter.
In the benchmark parameterization, we set unemployment income b at 0.7 of the aver-
age wage which is similar to the calibrated values of non-market work chosen by Hall
and Milgrom (2008) and Pissarides (2009).42 As mentioned in the main text, we also
consider a much higher value of this parameter, namely 97.7 percent of the average
wage which corresponds to the choice of Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008) and gives rise
41Note that there is no third parameter in the CES matching function since we require that
limλ→∞ m(λ) = 1.
42Hall and Milgrom (2008) calibrate the ﬂow value of unemployment at 0.71 of productivity
(0.73 of wages). Their value includes a reasonably low value of unemployment beneﬁts (0.25)
and reﬂects some risk sharing within households.
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to much more ampliﬁcation of aggregate shocks.43 For this parameterization, we recal-
ibrate all other parameters to hit the same targets as in the benchmark calibration.44
The exogenous quit rate is set at s0 = 0.0048 to match a monthly quit rate of 2 percent.
The entry cost parameter K can be normalized arbitrarily since all ﬁrm value functions
(and thus the free-entry condition) are linearly homogeneous in the vector (x, b, c,K).
As mentioned in the main text, the recruitment technology has the form c(V ) =
c
1+γ (
V
L )
γV , where we take a cubic function (γ = 2) for the benchmark calibration.
When we compare the benchmark results with those for γ = 0.1 and for γ = 8,
we recalibrate parameters c and b (equivalently, parameter K) to target the average
unemployment-vacancy ratio λ = 2.326 which gives rise to an average weekly job-ﬁlling
rate of 0.3 and the same b/w ratio as in the benchmark.45 We note that recruitment
costs per hire are reasonably low for all three parameterizations (below 1% of quarterly
earnings).
In our business cycle analysis, we choose the aggregate state process z as described
in the text and let the entry cost K vary with the aggregate state which stabilizes
the volatility of job creation at opening ﬁrms. Speciﬁcally, K attains the values
(324.6, 327.2, 329.8, 332.4, 335.0) in the ﬁve productivity states in the calibration with
b/w ≈ 0.7. For b/w ≈ 0.977, K attains the values (214.1, 218.5, 222.6, 226.6, 230.5).
To complement the cross-sectional results in the main text, Table 6 reports quarterly
job creation and job destruction rates in four diﬀerent size classes taken from the
Business Employment Dynamics dataset of the Bureau of Labor Statistics.46 The
model generates job creation and job destruction rates which are falling in ﬁrm size,
which is qualitatively in line with the data. The relationship is less pronounced than in
the data because we do not calibrate the transitory productivity processes separately
for each size class. Negative relationships between size and job ﬂows are also observed
for entering and exiting ﬁrms.
Computation
To solve the model numerically, we implement the procedure as outlined in Section
2.3.1. Given the discrete sets of idiosyncratic states x ∈ X and aggregate states z ∈ Z
and the corresponding Markov transition matrices, as well as a grid for employment L,
we solve recursive problems (14) for a given initial guess of multipliers μ(z), z ∈ Z, by
value-function iteration. To make sure that the free-entry conditions (15) are satisﬁed,
we adjust multipliers accordingly. This yields ﬁrm value functions G(L, x, z), as well
43This alternative value of b corresponds to 96.8 percent of the average (employment-
weighted) marginal product and 68 percent of labor productivity.
44Deviating from Table 1, we set c = 0.496, K = 236.3 (which follows from b = 0.1
and the choice of b/w ≈ 0.977), x = 0.104, (xi0) = (.273, .585, .913, 1.503, 3.060), (σi) =
(99.07, 0.80, .10, .025, .001), π = 0.06.
45Deviating from Table 1, we set c = 0.04092, K = 358.69 for γ = 0.1 and c = 1.274 · 109,
K = 287.46 for γ = 8 (ﬁxing b = 0.1 throughout).
46The largest size class in this dataset are ﬁrms with 1000 or more workers. Hence, we merge
the two largest size classes for the reported model statistics.
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Table 6: Firm size and quarterly job ﬂows
Size class 1–49 50–249 250–999 ≥ 1000
Data
Job creation 10.6 6.0 4.6 2.9
Job destruction 10.4 5.7 4.3 2.7
Job creation (openings) 3.0 0.3 0.1 0.01
Job destruction (closings) 2.9 0.4 0.2 0.02
Model
Job creation 9.6 7.5 7.3 6.3
Job destruction 9.4 7.3 7.2 6.4
Job creation (openings) 0.6 0.02 0.0 0.0
Job destruction (closings) 2.1 0.3 0.2 0.0
Notes: Data statistics are from the Business Employment Dynamics (1992-2011) of the Bureau
of Labor Statistics. Model statistics are from a cross section of 4.9 ·106 ﬁrms for the benchmark
calibration (γ = 2).
as policy functions λ(L, x, z), V (L, x, z), s(L, x, z).47 Given the calibrated (exogenous)
exit rates δ(x), this allows us to compute retention rates ϕ(L, x, z) = (1 − δ(x))(1 −
s(L, x, z)).
For the particular decentralization with ﬂat-wage contracts mentioned in the text,
we use the following procedure for the calculation. A ﬂat-wage contract oﬀered to a
new hire speciﬁes the wage w together with retention probabilities ϕ(L, x, z) that are
identical for all workers in ﬁrm (L, x, z). In a recursive equilibrium, this allows us to
rewrite the identities for worker value functions E(w,L, x, z), unemployment values
U(z), and the search surplus ρ(z) = μ(z), given by (58), (59) and (60) as follows:
E(w,L, x, z) = w + β
{
(1− ϕ(L, x, z))EzU(z+) (70)
+ϕ(L, x, z)Ex,zE(w,L+, x+, z+)
}
,
μ(z) =
m(λ(L, x, z))
λ(L, x, z)
(1− δ(z))βEx,z
[
E(w,L+, x+, z+)− U(z+)
]
, (71)
U(z) = b+ μ(z) + βEzU(z+) . (72)
Here L+ = L(1 − s(L, x, z)) + m(λ(L, x, z))V (L, x, z) is next period’s employment
which follows from the ﬁrms’ policy functions. Equation (71) deﬁnes the ﬂat wage
47Deviating from the main text, we write ﬁrm policies in terms of worker-job ratios λ, so
that matching rates m(λ) follow from the matching function.
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w = w∗(L, x, z) that ﬁrm (L, x, z) oﬀers to new hires. Subtracting (72) from (70) gives
E(w,L, x, z) − U(z) = w − b− μ(z) + βϕ(L, x, z)Ex,z
[
E(w,L+, x+, z+)− U(z+)
]
.
It follows that
E(w,L, x, z) − U(z) = A(L, x, z)(w − b)−B(L, x, z) , (73)
where A(L, x, z) and B(L, x, z) are deﬁned recursively by
A(L, x, z) = 1 + βϕ(L, x, z)Ex,zA(L+, x+, z+) , (74)
B(L, x, z) = μ(z) + βϕ(L, x, z)Ex,zB(L+, x+, z+) . (75)
From (71) and (73), we can compute the wage w = w∗(L, x, z) that ﬁrm (L, x, z) oﬀers
to new hires:
w∗(L, x, z) = b+
{
μ(z)λ(L, x, z)
m(λ(L, x, z))(1 − δ(x))β + Ex,zB(L+, x+, z+)
}
1
Ex,zA(L+, x+, z+)
.
For the model computation, we solve (74) and (75) simultaneously with G(L, x, z) in
the value-function iteration. This allows us to compute the ﬂat wages w∗(L, x, z) oﬀered
to new hires.
After we solve the model for the ﬁrms’ policy functions, we can ﬁrst simulate a sta-
tionary cross-section of ﬁrms (in the absence of aggregate productivity shocks). This
is done by following a given number of entrant ﬁrms (according to their permanent
productivity types and entry shares) along their lifecycles. Regarding business cycle
dynamics, we start from a stationary ﬁrm distribution and follow those ﬁrms across
time when aggregate shocks are active. The numbers of new entrants are determined
each period residually so that all workers are either employed or search for work at any
of the existing or entering ﬁrms.
70
Appendix D: Robustness
We explore the robustness of the main calibration results regarding diﬀerent parameter
choices for unemployment income b and for the returns-to-scale parameter α. Departing
from the benchmark calibration with cubic vacancy costs we consider two variations.
First, we consider the alternative of setting unemployment income to 97.7 percent of
average wages (68% of labor productivity), instead of 70 percent as in the benchmark.
Second, relative to the benchmark with α = 0.7 which gives rise to a plausible labor
share (with ﬁxed capital at any individual ﬁrm) we consider the alternative of α = 0.95
which is more in line with a model where capital can be adjusted at the ﬁrm level. In
both variations, parameters c, x and (xi0) are readjusted so that the model hits the
same calibration targets as in the benchmark calibration.48
Table 7 replicates Table 2 to show that both model variations are calibrated to match
ﬁrm and employment shares in the ﬁve size classes. The bottom three rows show how
the shares of younger ﬁrms are declining with ﬁrm size in the two versions. Relative to
the benchmark calibration, the model with high production function elasticity generates
considerably lower shares of very young ﬁrms in the larger size classes, which indicates
slower ﬁrm growth for this parameterization.
Figure 6 shows that the cross-sectional behavior of vacancy rates, vacancy yields, hires
rates and layoﬀ rates is almost unchanged relative to the benchmark calibration. That
is, irrespective of the parameter values for b and α, the model with cubic vacancy costs
explains more than half of the cross-sectional variation in vacancy yields, although the
vacancy yield curve for α = 0.95 (green/dotted curve) ﬂattens out at ﬁrm growth above
20 percent relative to the benchmark calibration (blue/solid curve).
48The calibration with α = 0.95 requires c = 15.64, K = 80.46 (again b = 0.1 and b/w ≈ 0.7),
x = 0.11, (xi0) = (.164, .184, .198, .218, .245), (σ
i) = (98.82, 1.00, .153, .025, .002), π = 0.027.
Parameters for the the version with b/w ≈ 0.977 are stated in footnote 44.
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Table 7: Firm size and employment distribution (higher values of b and α)
Size class 1–49 50–249 250–999 1000–9999 ≥ 10000
Data
Firm shares 95.62 3.64 0.54 0.17 0.02
Employment shares 29.31 16.23 10.88 17.64 25.93
% younger than 2 yrs. 24.68 7.24 4.38 2.26 1.08
% younger than 5 yrs. 39.71 16.88 10.19 5.35 3.65
% younger than 10 yrs. 57.76 31.30 20.23 12.01 7.14
Model (high b)
Firm shares 95.78 3.42 0.61 0.17 0.02
Employment shares 30.65 15.87 12.62 18.20 22.67
% younger than 2 yrs. 16.19 3.62 2.55 2.26 1.79
% younger than 5 yrs. 35.62 9.17 6.82 6.06 4.91
% younger than 10 yrs. 58.44 17.91 13.90 12.40 10.13
Model (high α)
Firm shares 96.27 3.06 0.50 0.15 0.02
Employment shares 29.23 16.36 11.60 18.27 24.53
% younger than 2 yrs. 16.13 1.65 1.30 0.95 0.42
% younger than 5 yrs. 35.41 6.79 5.75 4.78 3.50
% younger than 10 yrs. 58.12 15.28 12.24 11.66 7.59
Notes: The top two rows report ﬁrm and employment shares in ﬁve size classes (calibrated).
The bottom rows are the shares of younger ﬁrms in these classes. Data statistics are from the
Business Dynamics Statistics of the Census Bureau for the year 2005. Model statistics are from
a cross section of 4.9 · 106 ﬁrms. The model with high b has b ≈ 0.977w, γ = 2, α = 0.7, and
the model with high α has b ≈ 0.7w, γ = 2, α = 0.95.
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Figure 6: Cross-sectional relationships between monthly employment growth and
the vacancy rate, the vacancy yield, the hires rate and the layoﬀ rate. The dashed
curves (in the ﬁrst three graphs) are from the data used in Davis et al. (2013), the
blue (solid) curves are for the benchmark parameterization (b/w ≈ 0.7, α = 0.7),
the red (closely dashed) curves are for the calibration with b/w ≈ 0.977 and the
green (dotted) curves are for α = 0.95.
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Appendix E: Impulse response in a VAR model
We borrow the methodology for constructing the impulse responses in Figure 4 straight
from Fujita and Ramey (2007) - except for the details discussed below.49 We use data
from 1951:Q1 to 2011:Q4. The data is real quarterly GDP from FRED; the number
of vacancies is from the Help Wanted Index from Barnichon’s Composite Help-Wanted
Index series;50 the number of unemployed is from the CPS; employment is from the
BLS total payroll employment; and population is from the BLS. The job-ﬁnding rate
is then calculated in the same way as in Elsby, Michaels, Solon (2009).51 All data
other than GDP are averaged over their monthly (seasonally adjusted) observations to
obtain quarterly series. They are then logged and detrended by regressing each on a
cubic polynomial in time.
To generate impulse responses of output, employment, labor market tightness and
the job-ﬁnding rate to a permanent rise in productivity, we ﬁrst identify exogenous
productivity deviations in the data series and look at how the variables of interest
respond to these. Let
pt ≡ observed (detrended) output per worker ,
θt ≡ observed (detrended) vacancy-unemployment ratio ,
et ≡ observed (detrended) employment-population ratio ,
φt ≡ observed (detrended) job-ﬁnding rate ,
and let zt be the unobserved exogenous productivity deviation. To identify zt, we ﬁrst
estimate (by OLS) the following system:
ln pt =
[
ln pt ln θt ln et lnφt
]
⎡
⎢⎢⎣
A11 A12 A13
A21 A22 A23
A31 A32 A33
A41 A42 A43
⎤
⎥⎥⎦
⎡
⎣ LL2
L3
⎤
⎦+ εpt
=
[
ln pt ln θt ln et lnφt
]
A (L) + εpt ,
where L is the lag operator. Given this estimation,
{
Aˆij
}
, we follow Fujita and Ramey
(2007) by assuming that the exogenous productivity deviations, ln zt, can be identiﬁed
49We are grateful to David Ratner for providing an initial code.
50R. Barnichon, “Building a Composite Help-Wanted Index”, Economics Letters, Vol. 109,
175–178, 2010.
51M. Elsby, R. Michaels and G. Solon, “The Ins and Outs of Cyclical Unemployment”,
American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, Vol. 1, 84–110, 2009.
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by
ln pt<0 = ln θt<0 = ln et<0 = lnφt<0 = ln zt<0 = 0 ,
εˆpt = ln pt −
[
ln pt ln θt ln et lnφt
]
Aˆ (L) ,
ln zt = Aˆ11 ln zt−1 + Aˆ12 ln zt−2 + Aˆ13 ln zt−3 + εˆ
p
t .
Once a series for ln zt has been identiﬁed from the data in this way, an AR (3) process
for ln zt can be estimated,
ln zt = C01 ln zt−1 + C02 ln zt−2 +C03 ln zt−3 + εzt
= C0 (L) ln zt + ε
z
t ,
and the relationship between the endogenous variables ln et, ln θt, lnφt and the ex-
ogenous process ln zt can be calculated by estimating the following relationships (by
OLS):
ln et =
[
ln et ln θt lnφt
] ⎡⎣ B111 B112 B113B121 B122 B123
B131 B132 B133
⎤
⎦
⎡
⎣ LL2
L3
⎤
⎦+C1 (L) ln zt +D1εˆpt + εet
=
[
ln et ln θt lnφt
]
B1 (L) + C1 (L) ln zt +D1εˆ
p
t + ε
e
t ,
ln θt =
[
ln et ln θt lnφt
]
B2 (L) +C2 (L) ln zt +D2εˆ
p
t + ε
θ
t ,
lnφt =
[
ln et ln θt lnφt
]
B3 (L) +C3 (L) ln zt +D3εˆ
p
t + ε
φ
t .
The impulse-response functions to a permanent increase in exogenous productivity of
1% are then constructed by simulating these estimated relationships forward:
ln zt<0 = ln et<0 = ln θt<0 = lnφt<0 = 0 ,
ln zt≥0 = 0.01 ,
εˆpt≥0 = εˆ
z
t≥0 = ln zt≥0 − Cˆ0 (L) ln zt≥0 ,
εˆet = εˆ
θ
t = εˆ
φ
t = 0 ,
ln et =
[
ln et ln θt lnφt
]
Bˆ1 (L) + Cˆ1 (L) ln zt + Dˆ1εˆ
p
t ,
ln θt =
[
ln et ln θt lnφt
]
Bˆ2 (L) + Cˆ2 (L) ln zt + Dˆ2εˆ
p
t ,
lnφt =
[
ln et ln θt lnφt
]
Bˆ3 (L) + Cˆ3 (L) ln zt +D3εˆ
p
t ,
ln pt =
[
ln pt ln θt ln et lnφt
]
Aˆ (L) + εˆpt .
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Our construction diﬀers from Fujita and Ramey (2007) only in that their estimations are
based on data to 2005, they use three variables (pt, θt, et) for the VAR, and they show
impulse responses for a one-time rather than a permanent shock. We replicated their
settings and ﬁnd their results, and we checked that adding the fourth variable does not
qualitatively change the outcome for the three initial variables in their methodology.
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